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Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning from
Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First Century
PRISCILLA J. SMITH
This Article examines the use by anti-contraception advocates of the claims that
“contraception harms women” and “contraception is abortion,” claims made most prominently
in litigation challenging Obamacare’s contraceptive coverage requirement. See Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Article uncovers the nineteenth-century roots of these
arguments and the strategic reasoning behind their current revival, to reveal that these claims
are part of a broad attack on contraception grounded in opposition to non-procreative sex. In
Part II, the Article reviews nineteenth-century reasoning about contraceptives, and then in Part
III, discusses the modern revival of this Comstock era mode of reasoning about contraception
which connected immorality and illness. Today, however, considerable social acceptance of sex
for pleasure (at least for some people in some circumstances) means that straightforward
arguments against contraception based on its immorality do not resonate as successfully as they
once did. Social conservatives have publicly acknowledged as much, expressing an anxiety about
the position of religion as “belief” rather than “truth,” and about a rise in what they call
“sexualityism.” As a result, modern opponents of contraception have intentionally attempted to
mask outmoded and unpopular moral opposition to non-procreative sex by using scientific
discourse, citing the best science “we can currently lay our hands on,” for support.
The problem for anti-contraception advocates, as revealed in Parts IV and V, is that the
appeal to science is a purely rhetorical move, and their claims are contradicted by the latest
scientific evidence. The Article establishes the safety and benefits of hormonal contraceptives to
women’s and children’s health. The Article also shows that the claim that five hormonal
contraceptives are abortifacients is false. Four out of five do not interfere with implantation of a
fertilized egg and so cannot be said to terminate a “pregnancy,” even as redefined by opponents
as occurring upon fertilization. Opposition to these hormonal contraceptives is thus not truly
based on the view that destruction of a fertilized egg is immoral and should be considered an
abortion. Rather, the opposition goes much deeper, stemming from a general objection to all
forms of contraception and the ability of women to have sex without accepting the possibility of
pregnancy and motherhood. The Article concludes in Part VI with evidence of the benefits of
increased access to the most effective forms of contraception.
Anti-contraception advocates are deploying woman-protective health arguments to limit
access to contraception using a strategy similar to that adopted to oppose abortion. Anticontraception advocates have melded these arguments to contemporary anxieties about
heterosexual women’s ability to survive on equal footing with men in today’s sexual and marital
“marketplace” in order to stymie efforts to expand contraceptive access and to further restrict
access where possible.
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Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning from
Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First Century

PRISCILLA J. SMITH

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article interrogates two critiques of hormonal contraceptives to
reveal that both critiques are animated by moral arguments against all nonprocreative sex dressed up in faulty scientific reasoning. The two
arguments are: (1) that contraceptives are bad for women’s health, and (2)
that many hormonal contraceptives are actually abortifacients that
terminate pregnancy because, it is argued, they could prevent a fertilized
egg from implanting into a woman’s uterine lining. These claims circulated
in anticipation of challenges to the contraceptive coverage requirement in
the Affordable Care Act1 and were submitted before the Supreme Court in
the Hobby Lobby2 litigation in the form of an amicus brief filed on behalf
of a group called “Women Speak for Themselves.”3 Although these claims
garnered significant attention recently during the Hobby Lobby litigation,
in fact, the claims that contraceptives are bad for health and are morally
equivalent to abortion have a long pedigree.
In fact, the modern claims that “contraception harms women” and
“contraception is abortion” are modes of reasoning consciously modeled
 Associate Research Scholar in Law, Yale Law School; Senior Fellow and Director, Program for
the Study of Reproductive Justice, Information Society Project, Yale Law School. For their helpful
comments and suggestions, I thank Colin Agur, BJ Ard, Jack Balkin, Logan Beirne, Valerie BelairGagnon, Nick Frisch, Lauren Henry, Kate Klonick, Jonathan Manes, Gabriel Michael, Kerry Monroe,
Melissa Murray, Doug NeJaime, Sofia Ranchordas, Esteve Sanz, Amanda Shanor, Reva Siegel, and
Andrew Tutt. For excellent research assistance, special thanks are due to Liz Dervan. Thanks are also
due to the editors of this journal, especially Brendan Gooley, for outstanding editorial guidance which
greatly improved the Article.
1
See Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and Religious
Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 379 (2013) (arguing that the Affordable Care Act has challenged the
understanding of free exercise of religion as a human right).
2
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
3
Brief for Women Speak for Themselves as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–13,
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 1536 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) (claiming that “[t]hese
covered prescription drugs are specifically those that are designed to prevent implantation . . . . [W]hen
an embryo cannot implant in the mother’s womb, it perishes.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
in original)). The argument was presented in that brief in support of the doctrinal claim that the
government did not have a compelling interest in requiring contraceptive coverage and so could not
defeat the plaintiffs’ claim that the contraceptive coverage requirement violated the plaintiffs’ right to
free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id. at 1–2.
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on the claims of nineteenth century anti-contraception crusaders. These
Comstock crusaders believed that illicit sexual acts, including nonprocreative sex facilitated by contraception, were immoral and this
immorality was the cause of illness and harm to women. These beliefs
undergirded the federal Comstock Act, which banned the distribution of
contraception and information regarding contraception, as well as statelevel mini-Comstock laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
Today, however, considerable social acceptance of sex for pleasure (at
least for some people in some circumstances) means that straightforward
arguments against contraception based on its immorality do not resonate as
successfully as they once did. Anti-contraceptive advocates can no longer
rely on the tacit agreement that contraception leads to illicit sex, loose
women, and over-stimulated young men. Social conservatives have
publicly acknowledged as much, expressing an anxiety about the position
of religion as “belief” rather than “truth,” and about a rise in what they call
“sexualityism.”4 As a result, in reviving the message of their nineteenth
century counterparts, modern opponents of contraception consciously
chose to deemphasize moral arguments in favor of claims that
contraception is bad for women’s health, relying on scientific claims that
fall apart upon examination.5
Anti-contraception advocates are deploying woman-protective health
arguments similar to the woman-protective reasoning adopted to oppose
abortion6 when fetal-protective arguments failed to result in rejection of
Roe v. Wade.7. Anti-contraception advocates have melded these arguments
4

See infra Part III.
Importantly, these claims are styled as defensive claims against government overreach designed
to appeal to libertarians, anti-vaxxers, and other government skeptics along with social conservatives.
See, e.g., Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (discussing the plaintiffs’ claim that the federal government’s
contraception coverage requirement infringes religious liberty).
6
See Brenda Major et al., Report of the APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 6 (2009), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf
(noting that evidence indicates that the relative risk of mental health problems due to an abortion is
similar to the risk associated with an unplanned pregnancy, but that risk increases in certain
circumstances). Despite extensive evidence that abortion does not increase suicide attempts or ideation
overall, see id., anti-abortion advocates have had some success in using claims of such harm to regulate
abortion. See Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 904 (8th Cir. 2012)
(“[A]lthough the record reflects ‘medical and scientific uncertainty,’ as to whether abortion itself is a
causal factor in the observed correlation between abortion and suicide, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that abortion as a cause per se has been ruled out with certainty. As a result, the disclosure of
the observed correlation as an ‘increased risk’ is not unconstitutionally misleading or irrelevant under
Casey and Gonzales.” (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)) (citation omitted)).
7
410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming
central principles of Roe); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1643 (2008) [hereinafter The
Right’s Reasons] (“Instead, . . . [t]he supporters of [one state’s abortion] ban . . . speak in gentle tones
5
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to contemporary anxieties about heterosexual women’s ability to survive
on equal footing with men in today’s sexual and marital “marketplace”8 in
order to stymie efforts to expand contraceptive access and to further
restrict access where possible.9
The modes of reasoning that have undergirded efforts to regulate
women’s reproductive rights have not escaped attention. In 1992, Reva
Siegel observed that the Supreme Court reasoned “about reproductive
regulation in physiological paradigms . . . obscur[ing] the possibility that
such regulation may be animated by constitutionally illicit judgments about
women.”10 By relying on “natural,” physiological differences between the
sexes to regulate reproduction, the Court “deflect[ed] attention from the
social context in which judgments about protecting unborn life are formed
and enforced.”11
More recently, Siegel traced the emergence of woman-protective antiabortion discourse, documenting the spread of a new form of reasoning
about abortion. As she wrote in 2008, the “claim that women need
about how abortion hurts women.” (quoting Monica Davey, National Battle over Abortion Focuses on
South Dakota Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at A5)).
8
Alvaré, supra note 1, at 380 (claiming that “contraception affects the ‘marketplaces’ for sex and
marriage” by “lowering the ‘price’ of sex, by separating sexual intercourse from the understanding that
sex makes children,” and thereby increasing pressure on women to have sex outside of marriage); id. at
399 (arguing that contraception affects “sex and mating markets”). Alvaré argues that “[s]ingle women
thus feel pressured, because if they do not participate in sex, they are at a classic competitive
disadvantage because [s]exual activity without commitment is increasingly expected in premarital
relationships,” and that “the current sex and mating market enabled by contraception and abortion
operates to the disadvantage of women, and the relative advantage of men, due to a series of incentives
structured by their availability.” Id. at 409 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this argument,
Alvaré reflects a view similar to that expressed by Pope Pius XI in 1930 concerning the ramifications
of granting women equal status in marriage—that equality in marriage was a “false liberty and
unnatural equality” that would be to “the detriment of the woman herself.” Pope Pius XI, Encyclical
Letter, Casti Connubii (On Christian Marriage) (Dec. 31, 1930). A woman who “descends from her
truly regal throne to which she has been raised within the walls of the home” would “soon be reduced
to the old state of slavery . . . and become as amongst the pagans the mere instrument of man.” Id.
9
To be clear, it is my belief that difficulties women have in achieving and maintaining equality in
the world of sex, love, and family formation, stem not from women’s sexual equality and liberation, but
rather from continued enforcement of sexual norms that, among other things, prioritize the fulfillment
of male sexual desire over the fulfillment of female sexual desire. This enforcement of old sexual status
norms despite new legal regimes providing increased sexual freedom for women conforms to what
Reva Siegel has called “preservation through transformation,” the idea that even after legal structures
that reinforced certain status regimes are upset, those who contested the change in the legal structures
will continue to attempt to enforce the old status regime with modern arguments. See Reva Siegel,
“The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996)
(arguing that “civil rights reform can breathe new life into a body of status law, by pressuring legal
elites to translate it into a more contemporary, and less controversial, social idiom”). This point
deserves its own treatment and is beyond the scope of this Article.
10
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions on Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) [hereinafter Reasoning from the
Body].
11
Id. at 334.
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protection from abortion has been spreading within the anti-abortion
movement for decades and played a central role in arguments for the
abortion ban” enacted and later defeated in South Dakota.12 Like the earlier
appeals to nature and physiology, these woman-protective claims
emphasize women’s physiology and emotional makeup in advancing the
claim that abortion is physically and psychologically harmful.
As this Article documents, these woman-protective arguments have not
been confined to objections to abortion, but have migrated to undergird
opposition to contraception. The purpose of inserting this claim in the
movement against contraceptive access is to extend the reach of “woman
protective” arguments used to support restrictions on abortion13 and
ultimately to embed these arguments in the law.14 If successful, this
“abortionification,” as I’ve begun to call it, of contraceptives—which
includes redefining some contraceptives as abortifacients—could
undermine, or at the least prevent the expansion of, government programs
that provide contraceptives or coverage of contraceptives,15 such as the
Medicaid, Medicare, Title X programs,16 and the insurance programs
12

Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 7, at 1643.
See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1732–33 (2008) [hereinafter Dignity and the Politics of
Protection] (discussing the impact of the insertion of “woman-protective” language in the Supreme
Court’s decision upholding a restriction on abortion in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634
(2007)); id. at 1734, n.116 (citing Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson on ProLife Strategy Issues 6 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/Bopp%20Memo%2
0re%20State%20HLA.pdf (promoting an incrementalist approach to restricting abortion and expressing
concern about the potential that the Court could adopt a broader equality protective framework in a
case that does not involve incremental restrictions)); Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 7, at
1642–43, n.8 (“The woman-protective argument that appears in Carhart seems to have entered the case
not through findings of Congress or the lower courts, but rather through amicus briefs filed in the
Supreme Court . . . .”).
14
In the abortion context, “woman-protective” reasoning is at the core of arguments about the
proper standard to be applied in cases where the state claims that restrictions on abortion—such as
hospital admitting privilege requirements, restrictions on medical abortions, and abortion clinic
physical plant requirements—serve a state interest in women’s health. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nnecessary health regulations that have
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an
undue burden on the right.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted)); Planned Parenthood of
Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 593 (5th Cir. 2014) (“The opinion next
concluded that the statute places an undue burden on women seeking an abortion.” (emphasis added));
Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The plaintiffs . . . argue
that the statute would do nothing to improve women’s health . . . .”); Planned Parenthood Southeast,
Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1340–41 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (“The plaintiffs further argue that the
clinic closures would impose significant harms on women seeking abortions and that the justifications
are weak.”).
15
See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a Woman Is Pregnant, 8
GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POL’Y, No. 2, 2005, at 7, 10 (reporting that some states have enacted
measures that exclude emergency contraceptives from Medicaid coverage on the ground that users of
contraceptives intend to terminate pregnancies).
16
Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Amendments Act of 1965, P.L. 89-97, created the
13
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17

provided pursuant to the Affordable Care Act. As importantly, the
attempt to clothe opposition to contraceptives in a benevolent concern for
women’s welfare is revealed here as a pretext for promoting a familiar, if
outmoded, moral view that sexual intercourse is immoral if undertaken for
pleasure alone, without the risk of pregnancy.18 Sex for pleasure, at least
for women, is rejected.19
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II first reviews nineteenthcentury and early twentieth-century reasoning about contraceptives. It
demonstrates that the original opponents of contraception believed that the
immorality occasioned by contraceptives, that is non-procreative sex,
caused illness.20 Part II then traces the changing modes of reasoning used
by advocates,21 modern medicine,22 and courts23 that led to the landmark
Medicare and Medicaid programs that provide health insurance to the elderly and disabled, and to lowincome individuals, respectively. Title X of the 1970 Public Health Service Act, P.L. 91-572, created a
federal grant program dedicated solely to providing individuals with comprehensive family planning
and related preventive health services.
17
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148 (2010).
18
See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL
POLITICS IN AMERICA 1 (3d ed. 2002) (“The acceptability of birth control has always depended on a
morality that separates sex from reproduction. In the nineteenth century, when the birth control
movement began, such a separation was widely considered immoral.”); id at 9 (“[C]onservatives . . .
typically acceded to the notion that women were purer than men and that the only worthy purpose of
sexual activity was reproduction.”); id. at 161 (“They were . . . suspicious of contraception. They clung
to notions . . . that sexual intercourse ought to be for reproduction. . . . The characteristic nineteenthcentury suspicion of sexual pleasure itself shone through.”).
19
See id. at 9, 11 (“[T]he essence of Victorian sexual respectability was hypocrisy. Victorian
social norms preached the debilitating effects of sexual activity and the bracing effects of self-denial
and chastity, but the Victorians simultaneously created a gigantic prostitution industry, and it was not
unusual for ‘respectable’ men to patronize it. . . . This hypocrisy operated a double standard: the ‘fair
sex’ was to be protected from dirty matters such as . . . sex. . . . Sex drive became, supposedly, a
uniquely masculine trait. . . . Female chastity was no longer just a man’s right but now also a woman’s
destiny . . . . The motherhood ideology also defined the context in which sexuality was allowable for
women: the only justifiable purpose of sexual intercourse for ‘respectable’ women was reproduction.”
(internal footnote omitted)).
20
See, e.g., id. at 106–07 (surveying late nineteenth-century medical works that concluded that
contraception was “physically harmful,” and “as a mortal threat” posed complications such as
“hardening of the uterus” and “permanent sterility” (internal footnotes and citations omitted)).
21
See, e.g., id. at 138–39, 171–72 (comparing the efforts of pre-WWI radical sexual revolution
leaders to transform the birth control issue into a broader agenda that united women’s rights with civil
liberties, labor movements, and socialist ideology, with the later efforts of the “professional” reformers
who broke ties with socialists and radicals and relied on “centralized and professional campaign[s]”
that opened clinics and lobbied for legislation).
22
See, e.g., Note, Judicial Regulation of Birth Control under Obscenity Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 682,
685 (1941) (“By permitting medical use of contraceptives, the federal courts have removed the
impediment to vast improvements in public health standards threatened by archaic national legislation.
Both maternal and infant welfare may demand intelligent child spacing and postponement of
pregnancies until women are physically fit to undertake them.” (internal footnote omitted)).
23
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (reasoning
that Connecticut could not have grounded its ban on contraception on the notion that use of
contraception is immoral or unwise in itself).
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holdings in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird, providing
constitutional protection for the right to contraceptives. Part III then turns
to discuss the modern revival of the Comstock era modes of reasoning
about contraception. As it explains, modern opponents of contraceptive
access express anxiety about the ability of these moral arguments to
persuade.
In response, they consciously decided to argue that
contraception harms women’s health, vowing to cite the best science “we
can currently lay our hands on”26 to support those claims. In making this
discursive move, contraception opponents have connected contraception to
abortion to disrupt the gains made by Griswold and Eisenstadt, which
normalized contraceptive use in many ways. By linking contraception to
abortion, and emphasizing a claim that it harms women, opponents
cultivate a sense that contraception, like abortion, is immoral27 and
detrimental to women’s health.28
Part IV responds directly to these emergent health claims. The
problem for advocates is that they get the science wrong. This Article
establishes the safety of hormonal contraceptives and the benefits they
provide to women’s and children’s health.29 As it shows, contraceptives
pose few serious health risks to most women,30 actually reduce the risks of
some serious conditions to all women,31 and are far safer than the
alternative for sexually active women—that alternative being pregnancy.32
24
Id. at 485–86 (holding that Connecticut’s ban on contraceptives violated married couples’
constitutional right to marital privacy).
25
405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (holding that Massachusetts’s ban on contraceptives for use by nonmarried individuals, while allowing such use by married persons, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
26
Helen Alvaré, The White House and Sexualityism, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (July 16, 2012),
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/07/5757/ (“I propose to examine th[e] ideology [of equal sexual
liberty], not only from a woman’s perspective, but also from the best scientific evidence we can
currently lay our hands on.”).
27
See, e.g., Allan C. Carlson, Comstockery, Contraception, and the Family: The Remarkable
Achievements of an Anti-Vice Crusader, 23 FAM. AM.: ONLINE EDITION 3 (2009), available at
http://profam.org/pub/fia/fia.2301.htm (“Comstock’s greatest intellectual and political achievement was
to link abortion and contraception to the availability of obscene literature in city streets. Countless
observers have pointed to both aspects of linkage—abortion equals contraception and both acts equal
obscenity—as naïve, foolish, and the product of raw ignorance. In truth, Comstock’s views on
contraception were framed by his sense of the dangers facing children and by his own psychology of
the human mind; and they enjoyed the full support of a new and progressive American medical
leadership.” (internal footnotes, citations, quotations, and quotation marks omitted)).
28
See infra Part III. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 27, at 4 (“Comstock linked abortion and
contraception together for the common danger they posed to women’s health. In this view, Comstock
actually stood in solidarity with the cutting-edge medical authorities of his day.”).
29
See infra Part IV.C (arguing that contraceptives improve the health of children by, inter alia,
allowing women to increase the space between births).
30
See infra Part IV.B.1–3 (citing data discussing risks and benefits of hormonal contraceptives).
31
See infra Part IV.B–D (discussing medical evidence that use of contraceptives is far safer than
pregnancy, does not increase risks of cancer and actually reduces the risks of some cancers).
32
See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN:
CLOSING THE GAPS 105–07 (2011), available at http://www/nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13181
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This Part also makes clear that the claim that contraception is bad for
women’s health has normative content—that it is based on the view that
women should refrain from sexual activity unless they are willing to carry
any pregnancy that results to term.
Part V focuses on the attempt to equate contraception and abortion. As
this Article shows, opposition to hormonal contraceptives is not truly based
on the view that these methods of contraception are actually abortifacients,
or even on the claim that the destruction of a fertilized egg is immoral and
should be considered an abortion. Rather, the argument goes much deeper
to undergird a more general objection to all forms of contraception and to
the ability of women to have sex without accepting the possibility of
pregnancy and motherhood.33 On this account, the real objection to
contraception is not its detrimental effects on women’s health, but that it
allows women to be sexual beings who can avoid their “natural” roles as
mothers.34
Finally, the Article ends with the good news in Part VI that programs
providing increased access to the most effective contraception are already
having a significant positive impact on the health of women and children,
reducing rates of teen pregnancy, unintended pregnancy, poor pregnancy
outcomes, and abortions.35
II: NINETEENTH CENTURY OPPOSITION TO CONTRACEPTION
Women have been using various methods to control reproduction for
millennia.36 In the ancient world, long before humans understood the most
basic facts about the human reproductive process, people used homemade
folk remedies to attempt to prevent conception, with some success.37 These
(reporting, inter alia, that the mortality rate in non-smoking users of contraception is significantly
lower than the maternal death rate in live births).
33
See infra Part V (showing that opposition to four of these contraceptives has not been
withdrawn despite definitive scientific evidence that they do not work by preventing implantation of a
fertilized egg and so cannot be said to terminate a “pregnancy” under any definition of that term).
34
See, e.g., Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 299 (discussing the antiquated
notion that women should have little control over their reproductive destiny because their role as lifegivers is to ensure “reproduction of the social order”).
35
See infra Part VI (citing data from recent studies examining impact of providing full options
counseling and access to most effective contraceptives).
36
See GORDON, supra note 18, at 7–9, 13 (“People have tried to control reproduction in virtually
all known societies . . . . [B]irth control was widely practiced in pre-agricultural and nomadic
societies . . . . There is a prevalent myth . . . that birth control technology came to use with modern
medicine. This is far from the truth, as modern medicine did almost nothing prior to the 1950s to
improve on birth control devices that were literally more than a millennium old.” (relying on NORMAN
E. HIMES, MEDICAL HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION 3–4 (1936)).
37
See id. at 13 (“Birth control was not invented by scientists or doctors. It is part of folk culture,
and women’s folklore in particular, in nearly all societies. . . . An extensive folklore of birth control
was handed down from generation to generation in most traditional societies. . . . [There were a] variety
of attempts to prevent conception, and creativity . . . behind them . . . . They [were] developed by
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remedies included: homemade suppositories designed to coat the cervix
and prevent sperm from passing into the uterus, various spermicidal agents
made with acidic liquids like citrus juices or vinegar, rudimentary
diaphragms or other devices that were placed over the cervical opening,
various medicines or “potions,” douching or other attempts to “wash”
sperm out of the vagina after intercourse, rudimentary condoms using
animal skins or plants, withdrawal prior to ejaculation, and the “rhythm”
method.38 While these methods were improved upon over millennia, the
effectiveness of contraceptives was not significantly improved until the
development of rubber condoms and diaphragms in the nineteenth century,
and the introduction of hormonal contraceptives in the twentieth century.39
While birth control was “morally and religiously stigmatized in many
parts of [the] world,” it was also widely practiced.40 Use of contraception
was opposed by many, though not all, religious authorities on the theory
that interference with the procreative function of sex was immoral.41 The
basis for this opposition is reflected in the words of Pope Pius XI who
pronounced the view of the Roman Catholic Church in an Encyclical
Letter issued in 1930:
[T]he conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the
practice—through trial and error—in response to people’s needs. A cataloging of the extent, variety,
and ingenuity of these practices is eloquent testimony to the intensity of women’s concern.”); see also
id. at 16 (“[T]here is striking continuity between abortion techniques used in ancient societies and those
used in modern ‘home-remedy’ abortions.”).
38
See id. at 14, 16, 18–21 (outlining and describing all of the aforementioned pre-modern
contraception and abortion practices).
39
See id. at 14 (“All [pre-modern] techniques were practiced in the ancient world and in modern
preindustrial societies. Indeed, until modern hormonal chemicals there were no essentially new birth
control devices, only improvements of the old.”); id. at 32 (“[A] thriving nineteenth-century market
provided contraceptive devices that did work. . . . Condoms were second in popularity to male
withdrawal, according to the clinic studies of the 1920s and 1930s.”); see also LARA MARKS, SEXUAL
CHEMISTRY: A HISTORY OF THE CONTRACEPTIVE PILL 3–4 (2001) (noting that increased effectiveness
of the pill as well as other factors made the pill, first marketed in 1960, “a whole new bag of beans”
(internal citations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted)). By 1960, as demonstrated by the plaintiffs
in the Poe v. Ullman litigation, one study showed “a failure of contraception in 14% of the cases
studied with couples relying on the condom, 17.2% by those employing the diaphragm, and 48.2% by
persons employing all other methods.” Brief for Appellants at 12, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
(No. 60) (citing Alan Guttmacher, et. al., Contraception Among Two Thousand Private Obstetric
Patients, 140 JAMA 1265, 1267 (1949)). The effectiveness of modern contraceptives has taken a huge
leap forward in the last fifty years, with some methods now approaching 100% effectiveness, even with
typical use. See Div. of Reprod. Health, Nat’l Ctr. For Chronic Disease Prevention and Health
Promotion, U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria for Contraceptive Use, 2010, 59 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, June 18, 2010, at 1, 5 (reporting rates of effectiveness with typical use
of certain contraceptives, including 99.2% and 99.8% for the two forms of intra-uterine devices,
99.95% for the implant, 92% for the combined oral contraceptive pills and 92% for the pill (99.78% if
use is perfect)).
40
GORDON, supra note 18, at 7.
41
See id. at 7, 9, 14 (discussing the condemnation of birth control by Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam).
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begetting of children . . . . [T]hose who in exercising it
deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin
against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and
intrinsically vicious.42
Despite the condemnation of contraceptive use by many religious
authorities, in post-Revolutionary America birth control techniques were
used by many, and their use appears to have increased significantly from
the late eighteenth century—when women usually gave birth to eight
children—until the start of the twentieth century when in 1900 the average
married woman gave birth to three children.43 While social disapproval
drove the practice underground, a legal framework restricting
contraceptives was not established in the United States until 1873 with the
enactment of the Comstock Act,44 a federal law banning, among other
things, the manufacture, sale, advertisement, distribution through the mails,
and importation of contraceptives.45 As originally introduced, the bill
included a kind of health exception, allowing for prescriptions issued by “a
physician in good standing, given in good faith.”46 The bill was then
amended and the exception deleted,47 though it was unclear whether
Congress understood how the contraceptive ban would work, much less
that the amendment deleted the physician’s exception.48
42
Casti Connubii, supra note 8, at ¶54. In the same document, the Church condemned divorce,
see id. at 12, sex outside of marriage, see id. at ¶34, ¶79, and the emancipation of women, see id. at ¶26
(noting the “primacy of the husband with regard to the wife and children, the ready subjection of the
wife and her willing obedience”); see id. at ¶75 (noting in response to those who argued that women
should be considered equal in marriage to men, “this false liberty and unnatural equality with the
husband is to the detriment of the woman herself, for if the woman descends from her truly regal throne
to which she has been raised within the walls of the home by means of the Gospel, she will soon be
reduced to the old state of slavery (if not in appearance, certainly in reality) and become as amongst the
pagans the mere instrument of man”).
43
See GORDON, supra note 18, at 22–23 (noting that family size did not change as dramatically as
the number of births; that the decrease in infant mortality rates over the nineteenth century meant
women did not have to bear as many children to end up with a family of five; and that her account does
not take into consideration pregnancies that resulted in abortion).
44
Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (naming the law “An Act for the Suppression of
Trade in, and Circulation of, obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use”).
45
Id. at 598–99.
46
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1436 (1873) (discussing Bill S. No. 1572 prohibiting sale of
“any obscene . . . [literature or images] or other article of indecent or immoral nature, or any article or
medicine for the prevention of conception, or for causing abortion, except on a prescription of a
physician in good standing, given in good faith, or shall advertise the same for sale . . . or shall
manufacture [the same], . . . or shall print any such article”).
47
See id. at 1571 (approving the bill without the exemption); Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598
(1873) (failing to provide a good faith medical exception in the final act).
48
As others have reported, the substance of the Congressional Debate over the Comstock Act was
extremely limited, and some members of Congress complained that they did not have time to fully
understand the bill in general or the amendment in particular. Judicial Regulation of Birth Control
Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 682 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1436–37,
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A. Obscenity and the Connection Between Immorality and Health
As evidenced by the Congressional debates over the Comstock Act,
these nineteenth century opponents of contraception were fueled by the
belief that illness was punishment for immoral sexual behavior. The ban on
the manufacture and sale of contraceptives was enacted as part of a broader
“purity campaign”49 taking aim at the use of the mails to distribute
“obscene literature,” images considered obscene because of their ability to
cause sexual excitement.50 Congress was scandalized when it discovered
that trade in “obscene” or “immoral” literature was widespread.51
Representative Merriam of New York denounced the trade as a “nefarious
and diabolical traffic” that was a threat to the Republic and the “vigor and
purity of our youth.”52 He called “the attention of the country to this
monstrous crime,” and urged Congress to do all that they could
legislatively to achieve its “annihilation.”53 Merriam made an appeal to
masculinity, calling on his fellow Congressmen to bring “the outraged
manhood of our age” to condemn what “womanhood” had failed to stop,
that is:
the low brutality which threatened to destroy the future of
this Republic by making merchandise of the morals of our
youth. Recent revelations have convinced us that no home,
however carefully guarded, no school however select, has
1524–25, 1571 (1873)) (providing discussion of the bill in the United States Senate); CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 3d Sess. 2004 app. at 168–69 (1873) (providing a discussion of the bill in the House of
Representatives)); see also Peter Smith, The History and Future of the Legal Battle over Birth Control,
49 CORNELL L.Q. 275, 276 (1964) (highlighting that very little debate or discussion accompanied the
amendment removing the physician exemption from the act). On the other hand, the debate on the
whole reveals a Congress that was intent on enacting a more rather than less restrictive bill. See CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1524–25 (1873) (reassuring other Senators that the amendment to the bill
removing the physician exemption made “no material alteration in the section” and that “[i]t is rather to
strengthen it than otherwise”).
49
For a discussion on the emergence of “purity campaign” as a phrase that encapsulated the effort
to curtail the distribution of “offensive materials,” see Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to
Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2
Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 747 (1992).
50
See Judicial Regulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 682 (“By
forbidding the mailing, importation, and interstate transportation of indecent articles and obscene
publications and ‘contraceptives,’ Congress hoped to check the moral degeneration that followed the
Civil War.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Smith, supra note 48, at 275–76 (noting that section
two of the Comstock Act “prohibited the use of the mails for the sending of any of the materials or
articles outlawed in section one” (internal citations omitted)).
51
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. app. 168 (1873) (statement of Rep. C.L. Merriam)
(reporting on the seizure of 15,000 “letters written by students of both sexes throughout our land
ordering obscene literature”); id. at 1524 (statement of Sen. George Edmunds) (citing a Senate debate
where Senator Edmunds referred to the Comstock Act as the “immoral literature” bill).
52
Id. app. at 168.
53
Id. app. at 169.
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been safe from these corrupting influences. The purity and
beauty of womanhood has been no protection from the
insults of this trade.54
Merriam lamented the revelations that even “in some of our best
schools,” children “were students of a debasing literature, thrust upon them
by insidious and cowardly hands . . . a literature which kindles and
inflames the brute forces born in man, and over which religion and
education strive to obtain the mastery.”55 He decried the “destruction [of]
some promising boys, who, but for the deadly poison instilled into their
young minds might have developed into wise and good men.”56 Sexual
desire aroused by obscene literature was considered so destructive that
Merriam claimed that “victims of this traffic [of obscene literature] have
filled the prisons and mad-houses,” and the literature “corrupt[ed] the
principles, . . . inflame[d] the passions, . . . excite[d] impure desire,
and . . . spread a blight over all the powers of the soul.”57
The inclusion of a ban on contraceptive devices and abortafacients in
the obscene literature bill was urged by Anthony Comstock,58 a wellknown crusader and member of the New York Committee on the
Suppression of Vice.59 To support the connection between contraceptives
and the corrupting influence of obscene literature, Comstock reported that
his investigations found that the businesses were often combined.60
Moreover, contraception and abortion, like obscene literature, were
considered to promote sex for pleasure rather than purely for procreation.
Enacted at a time when pastors and parents warned that masturbation
would make you go blind, obscene literature and contraceptives were
considered part of the same evil to be stopped, the same threat to the “vigor
and purity” of the Nation.61 Where obscene literature “inflame[d]”
desires,62 contraceptives and abortion enabled people to act on their sexual
desires and engage in sex while escaping the fear of procreation and

54

Id. app. at 168.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. app. at 169.
58
See id. app. at 168–69 (quoting Comstock letter, included in Representative’s speech, stating, “I
could easily detect and convict [men engaging in the traffic of obscene literature] if the law was only
sufficient. . . . [A]ll we want to break up this nefarious business is a broader law”).
59
Margaret A. Blanchard & John E. Semonche, Anthony Comstock and His Adversaries: The
Mixed Legacy of This Battle for Free Speech, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 317, 320, 323 (2006).
60
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 168 (noting that those who sold the offending
pictures and pornographic stories also sold “rubber articles for masturbation or for the professed
prevention of conception” through the mails).
61
See id. (discussing the need to preserve the country’s youth by suppressing “trade in and
circulation of obscene literature and articles of immoral use”).
62
Id.
55
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sexually transmitted diseases.
Although the Congressional debates over the Comstock Act were
abbreviated,64 the debates show that drawing the connection between
expression of sexual desire for its own sake and ill health was essential to
the opposition. Opponents of contraceptives, nineteenth century physicians
prominent among them,65 stressed that sexual “impurity”—meaning sex for
pleasure rather than procreation—bred weakness, a lack of vigor, and
ultimately could make you physically ill.66 While the health of the entire
nation’s youth was at stake, crusaders against contraception expressed the
greatest concern for women’s health, exhibiting a woman-protective
reasoning that served crusaders well at the time given the significant
dangers of illegal abortions. Specifically, physicians claimed that
contraceptives would cause “hardening” of the uterus, sterility,67 “[l]ocal
congestions, nervous affections and debilities,” and other “diseases of the
genital organ, from simple inflammation to the most serious
degenerations.”68
Both historian Linda Gordon, and Reva Siegel in her seminal article,
Reasoning from the Body, trace the history of arguments made by leaders
of the campaigns to criminalize abortion and contraception.69 Physicians
argued that abortion and contraception were both evils, united in posing a

63

Id.
Id. at 1436–37, 1524–25, 1571 (providing the transcript for debates over obscene literature
within the Senate). Consideration in the House of Representatives was even more abbreviated. See id.
at 2004, app. at 168–69 (providing the transcript for debates over obscene literature within the House).
65
Much has been written about the prominent role of nineteenth century physicians in the
campaign to make contraception and abortions illegal and to obtain a near monopoly over the treatment
of upper and middle class women’s diseases, reproductive health care in particular, by limiting the role
of mid-wives. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 18, at 105–24; id. at 106 (“Physicians had obtained a
monopoly on the treatment of upper- and middle-class women’s diseases and pregnancies in part by
forcing out midwives and popular healers . . Birth control, part of the growing self-assertion of women
generally, particularly annoyed many doctors.”). See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10,
at 281–87 (citing also LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
(1984); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978)).
66
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 168-69.
67
GORDON, supra note 18, at 106–07.
68
Carlson, supra note 27 (quoting H.R. Storer, The Criminality and Physical Evils of Forced
Abortions, 16 and L.F.E. BERGERET, THE PREVENTIVE OBSTACLE, OR CONJUGAL ONANISM: THE
DANGERS AND INCONVENIENCES TO THE INDIVIDUAL, TO THE FAMILY, AND TO SOCIETY, OF FRAUDS IN
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE GENERATIVE FUNCTIONS 6 (P. DeMarmon trans., 1870)). See also id.
(noting physician “‘catalogue[d] the female diseases’ caused by these practices”) (citing Horatio
Robinson Storer, The Criminality and Physical Evils of Forced Abortions, 16 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
AM. MED. ASS’N 741 (1866)); id. (citing D. Humphreys Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine
Disease, 6 J. GYNAECOLOGICAL SOC’Y BOS. 194, 195–203 (1855)).
69
GORDON, supra note 18, at 106–07; Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 265.
64
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70

danger to women’s health. For example, a tract entitled Conjugal Sins
condemned as “linked and like evils, masturbation, contraception, and
abortion,” while a lecture entitled On Conjugal Onanism and Kindred Sins
delivered by a physician prominent in the anti-abortion campaign to
students at the University of Pennsylvania “sought to demonstrate the
diseases attributable to the interruption of intercourse.”71 The physician
argued that:
[M]an must suffer the punishment of the onanist if he parts
with the ‘seed of another life’ in any other way than in that
which it tends to become fruitful . . . [but] [t]he wife suffers
the most, because she both sins and is sinned against. She
sins because she shirks those responsibilities for which she
was created. She is sinned against, because she is defrauded
of her [conjugal] rights . . . .72
Yet another leader of the campaign to criminalize abortion argued that “the
prevention of pregnancy, by whatever means it may be sought, by cold
vaginal injections, or by incomplete or impeded sexual intercourse, is alike
destructive to sensual enjoyment and to the woman’s health.”73
Linda Gordon documents the claims made by physicians of the time
“that contraception was physically harmful, and the harm often described
as a mortal threat.”74 These physicians referred to the use of birth control
during sex between a married couple as “onanism” and “marital
masturbation.”75 Sometimes the claim was that interfering in the sex act’s
possible procreative function caused the harm. Sometimes the claim went
further. At least one physician opponent of birth control and abortion
“charged that not having children was in itself unhealthy: a woman still
childless at twenty-five would have a ‘continuous tendency to degeneracy
and atrophy of the reproductive organs.’”76 Having a few children was not
enough; continuous childbearing every two to three years was said to be
necessary for “permanent good health.”77 Indeed, according to a
contemporary anti-contraception advocate, when chiding a young female
journalist for seeking the decriminalization of contraception, Comstock
identified contraception as working “the greatest demoralization” and
70
Id. at 293; see also id. at 293 n.119 (“[C]linical case histories of women suffering diseases
attributed to conjugal onanism.”).
71
Id. at 293.
72
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
73
Id. at 294 n.122 (quoting HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY
WOMAN 61 (Boston: Lee & Shepard 1868)).
74
GORDON, supra note 18, at 106–07.
75
Id. at 107.
76
Id. (citation omitted).
77
Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 294 n.123 (quoting HORATIO ROBINSON
STORER, IS IT I?, A BOOK FOR EVERY MAN 115-16 (photo. reprint 1974) (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1868).
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specifically married immorality and disease declaring:
God has set certain natural barriers. If you turn loose the
passions
and
break
down
the
fear
you
bring . . . disaster. . . . It would debase sacred things, break
down the health of women, and disseminate a greater curse
than the plagues and diseases of Europe.78
B. Federal and State Court Litigation After Comstock and the Rise of a
Social Movement
Attempts to repeal or modify the Comstock Act in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries were unsuccessful.79 Ultimately though,
advocates for birth control,80 and a small group of sex reformers who
worked against sexual repression at the turn of the century,81 altered
societal acceptance of contraceptives and sex for pleasure.82 As medical
knowledge about contraceptives and reproductive functions modernized,
the Comstock Act’s connection between obscenity and immorality on the
one hand and contraceptives on the other hand proved the undoing of the
78

Carlson, supra note 27.
See Smith, supra note 48, at 276–77 (indicating that there were “unsuccessful attempts to repeal
or modify the Comstock Act” in 1878, 1919, 1923, and many times between 1930 and 1936).
80
Much has been written about the motives of early birth control advocates, such as Margaret
Sanger and the original founders of Planned Parenthood. There is significant evidence that one purpose
of promoting birth control was to limit family size among immigrants, African-Americans freed from
slavery, and the poor. GORDON, supra note 18, at 196–97. Though a small band of “free love”
advocates pressed for reforms for the right of all to express sexual desire in consensual circumstances,
see, e.g., id. at 126, the right to contraception as an issue of sexual freedom and women’s equality did
not become a prominent aspect of the movement until the mid-twentieth century. For different views on
the legacy of Margaret Sanger, compare ANGELA FRANKS, MARGARET SANGER’S EUGENIC LEGACY:
THE CONTROL OF FEMALE FERTILITY 66 (2005) (arguing that Sanger had a genuine commitment to the
eugenic ideology), with ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH
CONTROL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 195–96 (1992) (arguing that Sanger did not believe in the more
“offensive” assumptions underlying the eugenics movement, and saw eugenics as a method of
“controlled fertility” which would help women gain educational and economic opportunities).
81
For a short discussion of the work of these reformers, see GORDON, supra note 18, at 138–52.
See also EMMA GOLDMAN, ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 233, 237 (2d ed. 1911) (arguing that love
is free and should be separated from marriage and that “[i]t is safe to say that a large percentage of the
unhappiness, misery, distress, and physical suffering of matrimony is due to the criminal ignorance in
sex matters that is being extolled as a great virtue”).
82
Public opinion polls at the time confirmed the change in views. See Judicial Regulation of Birth
Control Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 685–86 n.35 (describing poll results which indicated
public opposition to birth control laws). In addition, studies confirmed a rise in sexual activity. See
GORDON, supra note 18, at 130–31 (describing a study of college-educated women which found that
women born between 1890–1899 had “twice as high a percentage of premarital intercourse as those
born before 1890,” and the trend continued. Of those born before 1890, 13.5% experienced intercourse
before marriage; of those born between 1890–99, the percentage increased to 26%; of those born
between 1900–1909, 48.8% had premarital intercourse; and of those born after 1909, 68.3% had
intercourse prior to marriage).
79
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Act’s contraceptive ban. In 1936, in a case challenging forfeiture of a
package of contraceptives that had been ordered under the federal
importation ban,83 the Second Circuit reasoned that because contraceptive
use to promote health was no longer considered immoral, a federal law
intending to prevent immoral behavior could no longer be interpreted to
preclude the use of contraceptives to promote health. As a result, the court
held that the federal statute did not apply to physicians who sought to save
the lives and promote the health of their patients.84 These physicians were
“excepted by implication from the literal terms of the statute.”85 Noting
that state law allowed for the sale of contraception to physicians “who may
in good faith prescribe their use for the cure or prevention of disease,”86 the
Court wrote:
All the statutes we have referred to were part of a continuous
scheme to suppress immoral articles and obscene literature
and should so far as possible be construed together and
consistently. If this be done, the articles here in question
ought not to be forfeited when not intended for an immoral
purpose.87
As a 1941 Note published in the Yale Law Journal commented, “[b]y
permitting medical use of contraceptives, the federal courts have removed
the impediment to vast improvements in public health standards threatened
by archaic national legislation.”88
After the teeth were removed from the federal Comstock Act, though,
state laws restricting access to contraceptives remained. In the early
twentieth century, courts issued influential decisions holding tight to moral
reasoning to uphold bans on contraceptive prescribing in states with some
of the most restrictive laws in the country—New York, Massachusetts, and

83
United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936). The claimant was an
obstetrician/gynecologist named Hannah Stone who testified that “the use of contraceptives was in
many cases necessary for the health of women” and that she prescribed the use of pessaries in cases
where “it would not be desirable for a patient to undertake a pregnancy.” Id. at 738. This testimony was
not disputed by the Government. Id.
84
Id. at 738.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 637–38 (N.Y. 1918)).
87
Id. at 739.
88
Judicial Regulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 685; see also id.
at 685 n.25 (“Maternal and infant deaths vary directly with the number of children per mother and vary
inversely with the length of time since the last preceding birth.” (citing, inter alia, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CAUSAL FACTORS IN INFANT MORTALITY 48, 60 (1940)). The author
also remarked on the alarming prevalence of unsafe abortions performed annually in the United States.
Id. at 685 n.26 (“Abortions bring death to at least twenty-two American women every day and cause
serious injury to countless others. Ninety per cent of such operations are performed on married
women.” (citing DOROTHY DUNBAR BROMLEY, BIRTH CONTROL: ITS USE AND MISUSE 138 (1934))).
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Connecticut. In these states, the newly formed Planned Parenthood
League had opened clinics that distributed educational materials and birth
control devices and advocates used civil disobedience to challenge the
restrictive laws.90
In 1917, a New York court rejected a constitutional challenge to the
state law, embracing the idea that the fear of pregnancy and sexually
transmitted infections was necessary to discourage immoral sex.91
Contraception removed this fear, thereby encouraging immoral behavior.
The New York trial court’s decision in People v. Byrne92 upheld the
prosecution of Margaret Sanger’s sister for distributing an educational
pamphlet concerning contraceptives:
While there are other reasons that keep unmarried people
from indulging their passions, the fear that pregnancy will
result is one of the potent ones. To remove that fear would
unquestionably result in an increase of immorality.93
In that case, the court explicitly rejected the idea that women had an
“absolute right to enjoyment of sexual relations” without the fear of
pregnancy.94 New York’s legislature liberalized its 1881 law to allow an
89
See State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 860 (Conn. 1940) (noting that between 1873, when Congress
enacted the Comstock Act, and 1940, at least twenty-six states passed laws relating to birth control, and
“[o]f th[o]se, eight, including Connecticut and Massachusetts, attempt[ed] complete suppression; . . . a
few (including New York) contain exceptions which permit prescription under certain circumstances”)
(citing Note, Some Legislative Aspects of the Birth-Control Problem, 45 HARV. L. REV. 723, 723–24
(1932); Note, Contraceptives and the Law, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 260, 260–61 (1939); MARIE CARMICHAEL
STOPES, CONTRACEPTION (BIRTH CONTROL): ITS THEORY, HISTORY AND PRACTICE; A MANUAL FOR
THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS, 354, 355 (1924)); Smith, supra note 48, at 279 (arguing that
Connecticut statutes were the “strictest in the nation”).
90
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 48, at 285 (noting that the defendant violated the Comstock Act by
selling “an article designed to prevent conception and distributing . . . pamphlets”).
91
See, e.g., People v. Byrne, 163 N.Y.S. 682, 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917) (ruling that fear of
pregnancy and venereal diseases was necessary to discourage immorality and was within the police
powers of the state).
92
Id. at 682.
93
Id. at 686 (“[T]he court is of the opinion that the public good justified the passage of this statute
and requires its enforcement.”); see also id. (“A statute making it a crime to advertise the treatment or
cure of venereal diseases has been held to be a valid exercise of the police power of the state, as it is
against public policy to advertise that such diseases can be easily and cheaply cured. ‘It has a decided
tendency to minimize unduly the disastrous consequences of indulging in dissolute action.’” (quoting
State v. Hollinshead, 151 P. 710, 711 (Or. 1915))); see also People v. Kennedy, 142 N.W. 771, 772,
775 (Mich. 1913) (holding that an act prohibiting the “advertisement of the treating or curing of
venereal diseases” was constitutional). The court wrote that one pamphlet entitled “What Every Girl
Should Know,” “contains matters which not only should not be known by every girl, but which perhaps
should not be known by any” and “contains pictures of certain organs of a woman.” Byrne, 163 N.Y.S.
at 684, 686.
94
Byrne, 163 N.Y.S. at 687. The next year, the New York court interpreted the state’s statutory
exception to be broad enough to protect a physician who in good faith gives contraceptive “help or
advice to a married person to cure or prevent disease,” but not to permit “advertisements regarding such
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exemption for physicians prescribing contraceptives for health purposes.
While many other states liberalized their laws to allow for medical use
of contraception at the very least, Connecticut and Massachusetts held
firmly to their Comstock era statutes and reasoning. In 1917, in
Commonwealth v. Allison,96 the Massachusetts high court upheld that
state’s 1879 statute banning contraceptives as within the police power of
the state “to promote the public morals and in a broad sense the public
health and safety.”97 The Court held that the Legislature’s purpose in 1879
had been “to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to encourage continence
and self restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home, and thus to engender
in the state and nation a virile and virtuous race of men and women.”98 The
same court confirmed this view in 1938. In Commonwealth v. Gardner,99
two years after the decision allowing medical prescribing under the federal
Comstock Act, the Massachusetts court again refused to liberalize its view
of the Massachusetts law, upholding the prosecution of doctors and nurses
of a birth control clinic. The court refusing to read the statute to include an
exception permitting physicians to prescribe contraceptives even if
intended for the “preservation of life or health,” and even if applied only to
married women.100 The Massachusetts high court finally allowed a very
narrow exception to sell contraceptives where “sold for the prevention of
[venereal] disease,”101 but refused to allow prescribing to avoid pregnancy
where the woman’s health would be particularly at risk during pregnancy.
Just four years later, the Court confirmed the narrowness of the exception,
upholding a conviction finding enough evidence that the defendant
advertised “instruments or articles” with the intent that they be used for
contraception as well as for protection against disease.102
matters, nor promiscuous advice to patients irrespective of their condition.” People v. Sanger, 118 N.E.
637, 637–38 (N.Y. 1918).
95
See Smith, supra note 48, at 278 (noting an exception to the New York statute that allowed
physicians to prescribe contraceptive devices for the “cure and prevention of disease”).
96
116 N.E. 265 (Mass. 1917).
97
Id. at 266 (upholding a ban on the advertising of contraceptive drugs, medicines, or articles).
98
Id.
99
15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1938).
100
See id. at 222–24 (holding that a complete prohibition on the sale of contraceptives was
necessary to suppress immorality); see also Commonwealth v. Corbett, 29 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Mass.
1940) (affirming the decision in Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1938), that the use
of contraceptives by married women for whom pregnancy was “unusually dangerous to their health”
was still prohibited).
101
See Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 8–9, 29 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Mass. 1940) (arguing
that the use of condoms for prevention of disease was valid because the victims of these sexually
transmitted infections could be “innocent” victims, such as the wives or husbands and children of a
guilty party who contracted the disease through illicit sex).
102
Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 55 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 1944); see also Smith, supra note 48,
at 277–79 (arguing that Massachusetts’s strict contraception statute rivals Connecticut’s statutes, which
are regarded as the “strictest in the nation”).

990

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:971

Similarly, in Connecticut, the prosecution of medical personnel at a
Planned Parenthood clinic for assisting and counseling a married woman in
the use of contraceptives in order to preserve her “general health” was
upheld against the defendants claim that the statute was unconstitutional.103
Citing the Massachusetts case and the early New York case approvingly,
the Court wrote in State v. Nelson104:
[I]t is not for us to say that the Legislature might not
reasonably hold that the artificial limitation of even
legitimate child-bearing would be inimical to the public
welfare and, as well, that use of contraceptives, and
assistance therein or tending thereto, would be injurious to
public morals, indeed, it is not precluded from considering
that not all married people are immune from temptation or
inclination to extra-marital indulgence, as to which risk of
illegitimate pregnancy is a recognized deterrent deemed
desirable in the interests of morality.105
The Connecticut court reversed the lower court’s ruling that the statute
was unconstitutional unless interpreted to include this exception,106 but
reserved the question of whether “an implied exception might be
recognized when pregnancy would jeopardize life.”107 Just two years later,
the Connecticut court confirmed this strict interpretation of the statute,
refusing to interpret the statute to include an implied exception to permit a
physician to give contraceptive information and prescriptions even to a
married woman whose life would be jeopardized by pregnancy.108
This refusal of Massachusetts and Connecticut courts to liberalize their
statutes to allow contraceptives to prevent pregnancy where pregnancy
posed a risk to the life of the woman set up the resulting challenges in Poe
v. Ullman,109 Griswold v. Connecticut,110 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.111 In
these cases, the Court had before it evidence refuting the claim that the use
of medical contraceptives was or could be harmful;112 establishing the
103

State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 856–57, 860, 862 (Conn. 1940).
11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940).
105
See id. at 860–61 (discussing legislative power to regulate “health and morals”).
106
Id. at 858, 862.
107
Id. at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108
See Tileston v. Ullman, 26 A.2d 582, 584, 587–88 (Conn. 1942) (refusing to rewrite the statute
to include an exception where an alternative to avoid harm to the woman existed, complete abstinence,
which “the legislature was entitled to believe was reasonable and practicable”), appeal dismissed, 318
U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
109
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
110
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
111
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
112
See Brief of Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 28, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (No. 60) (“Medical writers generally affirm the efficacy and
104
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widespread acceptance by organized religions of “the need for control of
conception by married couples in at least some cases;”113 and in Poe and
Griswold, establishing the extreme nature of Connecticut’s ban on the use
of contraceptives.114 The Court issued limited opinions striking down the
Connecticut115 and Massachusetts116 statutes, stopping well short of
celebrating a right to consensual sex. First, in a case challenging
Connecticut’s statute, the Court held that the law violated a married
couples’ constitutional right to privacy.117 Griswold represented a sea
change in that the Court did not entertain the idea that contraceptive use in
and of itself was immoral, though the Court left open the possibility that it
might be appropriate to use the fear of conception to deter illicit sexual
relations.118 Finally, in a 1972 case challenging the Massachusetts statute,
the Court stopped short of an explicit holding that single individuals had a
constitutional privacy right to contraceptives, but implied as much. The
Court held that if married couples had access to contraceptives, denying

freedom from deleterious consequences of drugs and devices for contraception.”); Brief of Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 15, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) [hereinafter Brief of Planned Parenthood, Griswold] (“As
is clear from Appendix B and the physicians’ brief, modern contraceptives are effective; they are safe;
they are freely manufactured and are distributed by doctors, hospitals and public health agencies
throughout the country; they are regulated (and validated) as to quality, safety and effectiveness by
governmental agencies.”); Brief of Appellee at 20, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (No. 7017) (“What is involved, is this appellee’s right to disseminate information and to distribute a safe and
medically approved article . . . .”).
113
See Brief of Planned Parenthood, Poe, supra note 112, at 30–37 (discussing statements from
and positions issued by Protestant churches; Jewish opinion leaders; and the Roman Catholic Church,
which expressed a limited approval of the rhythm method). For more information on the Roman
Catholic position, see sources cited in Brief of Planned Parenthood, Poe, supra note 112, at 35 nn.26–
27.
114
See Brief of Planned Parenthood, Griswold, supra note 112, at 27 (“Connecticut’s prohibition
of the use of contraceptives is unique. In no other American jurisdiction (or so far as we know, any
foreign jurisdiction), has the state imposed such a bar to marital freedom and privacy.”); Brief of
Planned Parenthood, Poe, supra note 112, at 37–38 (discussing the legal and widespread use of medical
prescription of contraceptives through the United States, and stating that “Connecticut alone has
legislated with reference to the ‘use’ of contraceptives and has construed its statute to prohibit use by
all persons under all circumstances”).
115
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480, 485 (holding that Connecticut’s law banning the use of
contraceptives cannot stand).
116
See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454–55 (“[Massachusetts] could not, consistently with the Equal
Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons.”).
117
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480, 485–86 (striking down a Connecticut statute, “which[] in
forbidding the use of contraceptives,” had a “maximum destructive impact upon” a relationship lying
with the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional rights).
118
See, e.g., id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (“There is no serious contention that Connecticut
thinks the use of artificial or external methods of contraception immoral or unwise in itself, or that the
anti-use statute is founded upon any policy of promoting population expansion. Rather, the statute is
said to serve the State’s policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they
premarital or extramarital, concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal.”).
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access to single people violated constitutional equality guarantees.119 The
Court also found it “unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has
prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for
fornication,”120 and questioned “the assumption that the fear of pregnancy
operates as a deterrent to fornication.”121
III. THE MODERN REVIVAL OF COMSTOCKERY—CONTEMPORARY
MODES OF REASONING AGAINST CONTRACEPTION
The nineteenth and early twentieth century view that contraceptive use
leads to immoral behavior, i.e., non-procreative sex, receded from the
public sphere after Griswold and Eisenstadt but reemerged publicly with
full force in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Perhaps most
brazenly, advocates for contraceptive access were accused of being sluts on
air by a prominent right-wing talk radio host during the 2012 Presidential
campaign,122 and were described as women whose libidos were “out of
control” by a former Governor and Presidential candidate during debates
over expanded access to contraception included in the Affordable Care
Act, setting off a media frenzy both times.123 In response to news that a
program through the Colorado Family Planning Initiative offering 30,000
contraceptive implants or intrauterine devices (IUDs) at low or no cost to
low-income women at sixty-eight family-planning clinics across Colorado
had lowered teen birth rates 40%, the Colorado Right to Life spokesman
objected that offering contraception to teens sends the message that you
can “have all the sex you want. . . . When you teach children that they’re
animals—that they have evolved from pigs and dogs and apes—then they
act like animals.”124
In reviving the claim that access to contraceptives increases immoral
119
See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 454–55 (“[Massachusetts] could not, consistently with the Equal
Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons . . . If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.”).
120
Id. at 448.
121
Id. at 449.
122
Jack Mirkinson, Rush Limbaugh: Sandra Fluke, Woman Denied Right to Speak at
Contraception Hearing a ‘Slut’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2012, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/rush-limbaugh-sandra-fluke-slut_n_1311640.html.
123
Aaron Blake, Huckabee: Dems Think Women Can’t Control Their Libido, WASH. POST (Jan.
23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/01/23/huckabee-dems-thinkwomen-cant-control-their-libido/; Abby D. Phillip, Mike Huckabee: Dems Think Women Can’t
‘Control their Libido’ Without Government, ABC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:58 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/01/mike-huckabee-dems-think-women-cant-control-theirlibido-without-government/.
124
Gail Sullivan, How Colorado’s Teen Birthrate Dropped 40% in Four Years, WASH. POST
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/12/how-coloradosteen-birthrate-dropped-40-in-four-years/ (quoting Colorado Right to Life spokesperson Bob Enyart).
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behavior, opponents appear to be intentionally modeling their efforts on
those of nineteenth century opponents of contraception and abortion,
especially Anthony Comstock. Allan Carlson, President of The Howard
Center for Family, Religion, and Society, draws on this nineteenth century
history in an article125 that appears as a sort of strategic blueprint for
contemporary opponents of contraceptives. The article celebrates the role
of Evangelical Protestants in general, and Anthony Comstock in particular,
in enacting the “only effective laws suppressing birth control information
and devices.”126 According to Carlson, opposition to contraception for
Anthony Comstock was grounded in “a natural law that encompassed
human sexuality.”127 Carlson grounds Comstock’s success in two
strategies. The first was connecting contraceptives and abortion to
obscenity and immorality. As reported by Carlson, Comstock argued to his
backers that the “availability of contraceptives encouraged immoral
behavior,” i.e., non-procreative sex, and that obscene literature was:
“[C]unningly calculated to inflame the passions and lead the
victims from one step of vice to another, ending in utmost
lust. [With] victims . . . polluted in thought and
imagination . . . the authors of their debasement [then]
present a variety of implements by the aid of which they
promise them the practice of licentiousness without its direful
consequences. [Birth control allowed the despoilers of the
innocents] to minister to the most degrading
appetites . . . [and] conceal the crime which may be
125
The article, Carlson, supra note 27, is published by The Howard Center for Family, Religion,
and Society. The Howard Center “believes the natural family is the fundamental unit of society; that it
is the basis of all healthy and progressive civilizations.” The Natural Family, HOWARD CENTER FOR
FAM., RELIGION & SOC’Y (Feb. 10, 2007), http://profam.org/THC/xthc_tnf.htm. The natural family,
the Center declares, “is the fundamental social unit, inscribed in human nature, and centered around the
voluntary union of a man and a woman in a lifelong covenant of marriage, for the purposes of:

satisfying the longings of the human heart to give and receive love;
welcoming and ensuring the full physical and emotional development of children;
sharing a home that serves as the center for social, educational, economic, and
spiritual life;
building strong bonds among the generations to pass on a way of life that has
transcendent meaning;
extending a hand of compassion to individuals and households whose circumstances
fall short of these ideals.”
Id.
126
Carlson, supra note 27. Anthony Comstock is described as “the apotheosis, the fine flower of
Puritanism,” “a symbol, a caricature, a physical embodiment of the entire cause of purity and
puritanism.” Id.
127
Id.
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128

contemplated or per chance already committed.”

In addition to embracing the notion that non-procreative sex is
immoral, Carlson also celebrates Comstock’s second successful strategy—
linking abortion and contraception together because of “the common
danger they posed to women’s health.”129 Carlson points out that Comstock
had the benefit of being supported by the nineteenth century physicians,
discussed previously in Part II.A, who believed that contraception caused
“uterine disease.”130 Carlson quotes physicians involved in the campaign to
criminalize abortion and contraception who believed that any attempt to
prevent pregnancy, even by a married couple, other than by complete
abstinence from intercourse “are alike disastrous to a woman’s mental,
moral, and physical well-being,”131 and that “‘[l]ocal congestions, nervous
affections and debilities are the direct and indisputable results of coitus
imperfecti.”132 In their view, intercourse using contraception was “rendered
but a species of self-abuse,” that is, masturbation.133
Carlson’s point is not that these pre-modern “medical” claims are
valid, though he is unconcerned that the views were incorrect. The claim
that contraception harms health for Comstock in the nineteenth century, as
well as for Carlson today in the twentieth-first century, is based in the view
that a sex act for pleasure—whether masturbation, sex with a prostitute, or
sex in marriage for non-procreative purposes—is an immoral act, a seed
spilled without purpose, a “conjugal onanism.”134 Its harm to health comes
from its immorality; linking these claims to a scientific discourse was a
128
Id. (quoting The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, Second Report (1876) in
NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN
VICTORIAN AMERICA 40–41 (1997) (quoting Comstock) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
129
Id.
130
Id. (citing D. Humphreys Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine Disease, 6 J.
GYNAECOLOGICAL SOC’Y BOS. 194, 195–203 (1855)); see supra Part II.A (discussing Comstock and
the alleged connection between obscene materials, contraception, and illness).
131
Carlson, supra note 27 (quoting Horatio Robinson Storer, The Criminality and Physical Evils
of Forced Abortions, 16 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 741 (1866)); see also id. (quoting a
physician stating that “‘[t]he evil results of the whole system of avoiding offspring in the married state
are so palpable and so gross, that one can scarcely find language strong enough to denounce it in
suitable manner’” and citing the “‘catalogue of the female diseases’ caused by these practices”); see
supra Part II.A (“As evidenced by the Congressional debates over the Comstock Act, these nineteenth
century opponents of contraception were fueled by the belief that illness was punishment for immoral
sexual behavior.”).
132
Carlson, supra note 27.
133
Id. (quoting AUGUSTUS K. GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAWS OF LIFE AND
HEALTH 230–31 (1870)).
134
Id. (citing L.F.E. BERGERET, THE PREVENTIVE OBSTACLE, OR CONJUGAL ONANISM: THE
DANGERS AND INCONVENIENCES TO THE INDIVIDUAL, TO THE FAMILY, AND TO SOCIETY, OF FRAUDS IN
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE GENERATIVE FUNCTIONS 6 (P. DeMarmon trans., 1870)). (concluding
that “Genesiac frauds [contraception] may provoke in [the woman] diseases of the genital organ, from
simple inflammation to the most serious degenerations.”) (emphasis added)).

2015]

CONTRACEPTIVE COMSTOCKERY

995

way to validate the claims to the mainstream. His point is that this linkage
of contraception and abortion to immorality and illness—supported by the
pre-modern views of some anti-contraceptive crusaders at the time—was
successful.
A debate in the on-line magazine Public Discourse provides further
insight into contemporary opposition to contraception.135 In those pages,
social conservatives have been remarkably transparent about their hostility
to contraceptive use and about their view that non-procreative sex is
“immoral,” even when between married couples.136 Scholars advocating a
“natural law” approach,137 such as John Finnis and Robert George, believe
that all forms of non-procreative sex, from sex between persons of the
same sex, to masturbation, fornication, adultery and bestiality, are equally
immoral, because they share the same “one morally disqualifying
feature.”138 The “truly morally significant thing” about all these nonprocreative forms of sex, according to Finnis and George, is that, “in
diverse forms, they involve disrespect for the basic good of marriage.”139
As socially conservative scholars debate the ethics of sex,140 often in
the on-line pages of Public Discourse, they express an anxiety about the
position of religion as “belief” rather than “truth,” about the ability of their
moral beliefs to convince, and about the salience of their ethics to the
younger generation and the rise in what one scholar calls “sexualityism.”141
For example, Gerry Bradley decries the statement of an English Lord
(aptly named Lord Justice Laws) who declared, in denying a religious
135
This opposition is part of what have been called the “conscience wars.” See generally Doug
NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015).
136
See, e.g., John Finnis, Robert P. George, Natural Law and the Unity and Truth of Sexual
Ethics: A Reply to Gary Gutting, at 3 PUBLIC DISCOURSE, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com
/2015/03/14635/?utm_source=The+Witherspoon+Institute&utm_campaign=7523d98a78RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15ce6af37b-7523d98a78-84111329
137
Id. (arguing that “Catholic sexual ethics are as fully reasonable today as they were in the time
of St Paul. In fact, the natural law understanding of human fulfillment is inherently intelligible even
without a theistic framework.”).
138
Id. (“[I]f people are willing to perform a sex act that fails to embody permanent commitment,
or a bond that is procreative in type (whether or not it is, or can in the circumstances be, procreative in
effect), they disable themselves from willing in such a way that their sexual congress can actualize and
express the good of marriage, which is inherently permanent and procreative in type.”). Finnis and
George are careful to point out that although all these forms of non-procreative sex share the same
“morally disqualifying feature,” “[bestiality] is more degrading than the others, of course, in expressing
an equality between persons and beasts; these kinds of act aren’t alike in every morally significant
respect and degree—the point is just that there is one morally disqualifying feature they all share.” Id.
139
Id. (“only acts of spouses that fulfill the behavioral conditions of procreation have validly
consummated marriage—and they do that whether or not the non-behavioral conditions of procreation
happen to obtain. In short, only such sex acts are marital.”).
140
For now, I leave to others the efforts to puzzle about how masturbation or non-procreative sex
between a married heterosexual couple, or any sex other than adultery in relation to the adulterer’s own
marriage is showing disrespect for the basic good of marriage.
141
Id. (defining sexualityism as “a commitment to uncommitted, unencumbered, inconsequential
sex”).
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exemption to a relationship counselor who would not endorse the sexual
activities of same-sex couples, that any exemption would be
“unprincipled” because it would not “advance the general good on
objective grounds, but . . . give effect to the force of subjective opinion.”142
As Bradley complains:
How so? [Justice] Laws asserted that it “must be so, since in
the eyes of everyone save the believer religious faith is
necessarily subjective, being incommunicable by any kind of
proof or evidence. It may of course be true; but the
ascertainment of such a truth lies beyond the means by
which laws are made in a reasonable society.” Against the
demands of “equal sexual liberty” . . . solicitude for the
opaque commitments of the religious subject count for
nothing.143
If their moral beliefs no longer hold the power of “truth,” a new source of
truth must be marshaled, and that, it is suggested, is scientific truth. As
scholar Helen Alvaré proclaims, “I propose to examine th[e] ideology [of
equal sexual liberty], not only from a woman’s perspective, but also from
the best scientific evidence we can currently lay our hands on.”144 Thus, the
decision to reason through science, to muster the best science “we can lay
our hands on” in support of a moral claim against contraception emerges as
a strategic and practical decision made because of a concern that moral
arguments will no longer persuade on their own.
Adopting this blueprint, the Hobby Lobby amicus brief filed on behalf
of “Women Speak for Themselves,”145 and the article on which the brief
appears to have been based,146 also bear a remarkable resemblance to
Carlson’s Comstock strategy. Contraception is linked directly with
abortion, and opposition to increased access to contraceptives is based in
part, as it was in the nineteenth century, on the claim that contraceptive use
will make women sick. Styled as a defensive claim—specifically a claim
that government tyranny forces conscientious objectors to be complicit in
sin—this form of opposition to contraception is designed to appeal both to
libertarians, anarchists and other government skeptics who oppose
government overreach no matter their views on contraception itself, as well
142
Gerard V. Bradley, What’s Behind the HHS Mandate, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (June 5, 2012),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/06/5562/.
143
Id.
144
Helen Alvaré, The White House and Sexualityism, supra note 26 (“I propose to examine th[e]
ideology [of equal sexual liberty], not only from a woman’s perspective, but also from the best
scientific evidence we can currently lay our hands on.”).
145
Brief of Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3.
146
Alvaré, supra note 1.
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as to social conservatives who champion a normative view in which sexual
intercourse takes place only between heterosexual married couples intent
on procreation.
While these opponents of contraception believe in the immorality of
contraceptive use, they attempt to efface the morality claims by arguing in
the language of science and medicine (1) that contraceptives are harmful to
women’s physical health, and (2) that some hormonal contraceptives are
abortifacients—both of which are contradicted by scientific and medical
knowledge. The difference between these health claims based on science
and the former health claims based on morals is that we can test them.147
By every measure of objective scrutiny, these claims lack scientific basis,
and are just the latest version of the idea that sex for pleasure—not for
procreative purposes—is immoral, and that this immoral act will make you
sick.148

147
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637,
1652 (1998) (“When moral claims are . . . defended as functional—a space is created for moral
criticism based on empirical investigation. In that situation we can employ the moral premises of the
culture whose morality is at issue, and reasoning from common premises reach a conclusion that our
local interlocutor may be forced as a matter of logic to accept (if he is logical).”); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 220–40 (1992) (“this kind of instrumental criticism of moral codes,
specifically codes of sexual morality”).
148
Another version of the claim is seen in the abortion context, where opponents of abortion have
argued, despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary, that abortion causes breast cancer and
mental health harms. A woman who decides not to carry a pregnancy to term must be making herself
sick, these advocates believe, because it is so against her very nature. See, e.g., Report of the South
Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, LIBERTY COUNS. 41, 52 (2005), http://www.lc.org/attachments
/SD_abortion_rpt.pdf (listing “negative effects of abortion” including anxiety, psychological numbing,
depression, and suicidal ideation, and explaining that “attachment between mother and child begins
most immediately after conception and the basis of maternal attachment is both psychological and
physical, and this process, and the natural protective urges of maternal attachment, often form
irrespective of whether the pregnancy was intended or wanted”); but cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing studies in support of the proposition that the
weight of scientific evidence does not comport “with the idea that having an abortion is any more
dangerous to a woman’s long-term mental health than delivering and parenting a child that she did not
intend to have”); Fact Sheet: Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST.
(Jan. 12, 2010), http:// www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (“In February
2003, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) convened a workshop of over 100 of the world’s leading
experts who study pregnancy and breast cancer risk. . . . They concluded that having an abortion or
miscarriage does not increase a woman’s subsequent risk of developing breast cancer.”); Report of the
APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 4 (2008),
http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf (noting that evidence indicates that
the relative risk of mental health problems due to an abortion is similar to the risk associated with an
unplanned pregnancy but that risk increases in certain circumstances). See also MKB Mgm’t Corp. v.
Burdick, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1062 (D.N.D. 2014) (explaining that the government has an interest in
preventing pre-viability abortions to “protect[] the physical and mental health of women who may seek
to procure an abortion”); Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 7, at 1688 (discussing reliance on
claims that abortion harms women to support abortion restrictions).
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IV. CONTRACEPTIVES SAVE WOMEN’S LIVES, AND
BENEFIT THE HEALTH OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN.
The overwhelming global medical consensus is that contraceptives
improve women’s health and lives. Government bodies under both
Republican149 and Democratic Administrations and a wide range of
private-sector experts, such as the American Medical Association and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, have long
recognized that contraceptive services are a safe, vital, and effective
component of preventive and public health care.150 As the most
authoritative text on contraceptives states: “In general contraceptives pose
few serious health risks to users . . . [and] the use of contraceptive methods
is generally far safer than pregnancy.”151 It is indisputable that
contraception allows individual women who are sexually active to control
their reproductive lives safely by choosing whether to vastly reduce their
risk of pregnancy to near zero.152
Despite the overwhelming support for contraceptive use among
medical authorities worldwide, opponents of contraception today have
begun to follow the lead of their nineteenth century counterparts,153
claiming that contraceptives are bad for women’s health.154 These bad for
health claims have been made most prominently in an amicus brief155 filed
in the Hobby Lobby156 litigation. The brief criticizes the federal
government’s brief in the case as well as the Institute of Medicine
Report157 (IOM Report) that recommended that contraceptives be included
149
See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052–71 (2011) (discussing the realignment of the Republican
party on abortion).
150
Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services And Supplies
Without Cost-Sharing, 14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2011, at 7, 7–9 (2011).
151
ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 61 (20th rev. ed. 2011).
152
For efficacy rates of various contraceptives, see U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note
39, at 5.
153
Notably, although their claims are focused on hormonal contraceptives, the opponents do not
recommend the use of the presumably safe “barrier” methods (condoms and diaphragms) but instead
advocate sexual abstinence or the rhythm method—even within marriage—as the alternative for
women who do not desire pregnancy and childbirth. See Alvaré, supra note 1, at 382 (discussing the
Catholic religion’s “refusal to facilitate access to contraception”). In this way, the opponents reveal that
underlying their critique of contraceptives is the fundamental moral belief—one shared with Anthony
Comstock—that any interference with the possibility of procreation during intercourse is itself
immoral.
154
See, e.g., id. at 412 (“[T]here is additional evidence that greater use of contraception . . . can
harm women’s health.”).
155
Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 33–36.
156
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
157
See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE
GAP, supra note 32 (recommending that contraceptive services be provided at no cost as part of the
Affordable Care Act, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 424
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)).
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at no cost as part of the preventive health care package required under the
Affordable Care Act.158 The brief claims that the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and its IOM Report “does not devote
sufficient attention to the possibility that increasing access to contraception
might directly harm women’s health.”159 The brief goes on to claim that
hormonal contraceptives have cardiovascular risks, cause cancer, and
increase the risk of contracting HIV.160 It also attempts to undermine the
IOM Report’s findings that contraceptives (1) are good for women because
they reduce unintended pregnancies, and therefore abortions,161 and (2) are
good for children both because they increase the spacing between births
which results in healthier birth outcomes,162 and increase the proportion of
children born who are wanted.163 Some of the claims made in the amicus
brief are simply incorrect; others nonsensical. In what follows, I refute
these health claims.
A. Contraindications and the Medical Eligibility Criteria
The claim made by the amicus brief that contraceptives harm women’s
health appears to be based primarily on concerns about women for whom
the use of hormonal contraceptives carries higher-risks than for most
women.164 For example, opponents harp on the idea that hormonal
contraceptives may be contraindicated for some women who smoke,165 as
if women will be prescribed contraceptives without regard to their risk
factors, and as if the fact that hormonal contraceptives are not appropriate
for some women makes them inappropriate for all women. They also
ignore the fact that pregnancy is usually far more dangerous than hormonal
contraceptives for women whose medical conditions or health histories
158

Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 4–5.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 33. The brief argues
that the regulations do not serve a sufficiently compelling state interest to defeat the plaintiffs’ claims
that the regulations violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id. at 4–10. After
assuming without deciding that the regulations served a compelling state interest, Hobby Lobby, 134 S.
Ct. at 2759, the Court then held that the government did not meet its burden under RFRA of
establishing that the regulations were narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 2781–82. Justice
Kennedy wrote separately to stress that “[i]t is important to confirm that a premise of the Court’s
opinion is its assumption that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and compelling
interest in the health of female employees,” which could indicate that he believes the interest is
compelling. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, this remains unclear.
160
Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 35–36.
161
Id. at 22–31.
162
Id. at 11–14.
163
See id. at 22–29 (arguing that HHS’s claim that increased contraceptive use reduces rates of
unintended pregnancy is not borne out by the evidence).
164
Id. at 33–37.
165
See Alvaré, supra note 1, at 417 (“[A]s of 2008, over 18% of American women smoke . . . .
This is a large cohort of women who might both receive free hormonal contraception as a consequence
of the . . . Mandate, while being admittedly quite susceptible to harms from hormonal contraceptives.”).
159
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counsel against the use of hormonal contraceptives.
If hormonal
contraceptives carry unacceptable risks for individual woman,167 other
methods such as barrier methods are an option. Rather than recommending
that these women use non-hormonal contraceptives, however, opponents of
contraception counsel only sexual abstinence.168
Like other medical providers, family planning providers take into
consideration the risks of treatment for an individual patient, as compared
to alternative treatments or the option of no treatment. To optimize and
improve uniformity in contraceptive prescribing, the World Health
Organization created “medical eligibility criteria,” evidence-based
guidance on the safety of contraceptive method use for women and men
worldwide who have specific characteristics and medical conditions.169
The World Health Organization used a “consensus process” involving a
group of “international family planning experts” who reviewed the best
medical evidence available globally.170 Experts report that in the absence
of these guidelines, “[p]ast experience suggests that . . . unnecessary
restrictions to contraceptive access may be imposed.”171
First published in 1996, the World Health Organization Medical
Eligibility Criteria for Contraceptive Use is now in its fourth edition,172 and
was recently adapted for U.S. providers by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.173 The U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria for Contraceptive
Use, 2010174 classifies medical conditions that affect eligibility for
different types of contraception into four numeric categories as follows:
Category 1. A condition for which there is no restriction for
the use of the contraceptive method.
Category 2. A condition for which the advantages of using
166

See supra Part IV.B.1; see also HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 61 (“[T]he use of
contraceptive methods is generally far safer than pregnancy.”).
167
See HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 61–63 (noting that while “[i]n general, contraceptives
pose few serious health risks,” some have been linked to higher risks of cardiovascular disease and
some types of cancer).
168
See Alvaré, supra note 1, at 435 (“It should only be remarked here that the churches opposing
the Mandate hold, and teach women and men to maintain, an understanding of the sacredness of sexual
intercourse, and its intrinsic connection with the procreating of new, vulnerable, human life.”).
169
See U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note 39, at 1.
170
See HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 75–76
171
Id. at 75 (discussing need for continual updating of medical eligibility criteria to keep up with
new scientific evidence).
172
Id.; see also U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note 39, at 1–2 (discussing process for
development of criteria).
173
Id. at 1–2. The CDC MEC included changes taking new scientific evidence into account. Id. at
2.
174
See U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note 39, at 1–2 (containing recommendations for
health-care providers for the safe use of contraceptive methods by women and men with various
characteristics and medical conditions).
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the method generally outweigh the theoretical or proven
risks. (The method can generally be used, but careful followup may be required.)
Category 3. A condition for which the theoretical or proven
risks usually outweigh the advantages of using the
method. . . . Provision of a . . . method to a woman with
a . . . Category 3 [condition] requires careful clinical
judgment and access to clinical services. The severity of the
condition and the availability, practicality, and acceptability
of alternative methods should be taken into account.
Category 4. A condition that represents an unacceptable
health risk if the contraceptive method is used.175
Following the eligibility criteria, family planning providers in the U.S.
take into account an individual patient’s particular circumstances,176 and
(1) determine whether this individual patient has a condition for which
certain contraceptives are contraindicated; and (2) compare the risk of
treatment compared to alternative treatments or no treatment. Physicians
take answers to these questions and additional elements such as
effectiveness, availability (including accessibility and affordability), and
acceptability into account when making recommendations to patients.177
As the textbook Contraceptive Technology notes, these “[e]vidence-based
guidelines regarding which women are medically eligible for contraceptive
methods will help to assure that women are not exposed to inappropriate
risks, while at the same time not denied access to methods that are
medically appropriate.”178 Throughout all counseling, “[v]oluntary
informed choice of contraception methods is an essential guiding
principle.”179 A review of specific risks follows.
B. Benefits and Risks of Contraceptives to Women’s Health
Anti-contraception opponents ignore that hormonal contraceptives
benefit women’s health by reducing the risks to all women of some serious
conditions, including protection against some cancers, and that they are far
175

HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 77–78.
See id. at 76 (“[U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria] recommendations are meant to serve as a
source of general clinical guidance. Health care providers should always consider the individual
clinical circumstances of each person seeking family planning services.”).
177
Id. at 80; see id. at 46 (“Because most people will use a variety of contraceptive methods
throughout their lives, they should be knowledgeable about various contraceptive methods. The
patient’s choice of a contraceptive method depends on several major factors: efficacy, safety, cost,
noncontraceptive benefits, and personal considerations.”).
178
Id. at 75.
179
Id. at 80.
176

1002

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:971

safer than the alternative for sexually active women—the alternative being
pregnancy.180 There are risks, however, that must always be taken into
account. Here I consider the risks of death, cancer, and cardiovascular
disease.
1. Risk of Death from Pregnancy Versus Hormonal Contraception
The risk of death from pregnancy in the United States is 1 in 6,900,181
while the risk of death from using combined oral contraceptives is as
follows:
nonsmokers aged 15-34

1 in 1,667,000

nonsmokers aged 35-54

1 in 33,300

smokers aged 15-34

1 in 57,800

smokers aged 35-54

1 in 5,200182

Patients who are properly informed of these risks can choose whether to
use contraceptives, and if they desire to use contraceptives, which
contraceptives to use.
2. Impact on Cancer Risks
Opponents falsely claim that contraceptive pills cause cancer,183 citing
primarily184 to the inclusion of estrogen-progestogen oral contraceptives,
also known as combined oral contraceptives or COCs, on a list of “known

180
Id. at 61–68; Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. 39,870, 39,872 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590, 45
C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (citing INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING
THE GAPS 107 (2011)).
181
Id. at 62 (citing Cynthia Berg et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality in the United States, 1998 to
2005, 116 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1302, 1302 (2010)).
182
Id. (citing Pamela Schwingl et al., Estimates of the Risk of Cardiovascular Death Attributable
to Low-Dose Oral Contraceptives in the United States, 180 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 241,
241–49 (1999)).
183
Brief of Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 33–36.
184
The brief also cites a World Health Organization document without mentioning that the
document states (1) that “the use of COCs modifies slightly the risk of cancer, increasing it in some
sites (cervix, breast, liver), decreasing it in others (endometrium, ovary),” (2) that some of the data
showing increased risk “refer to older higher-dose COC preparations,” and (3) that WHO committees
that create evidence-based family planning guidelines based on regular reviews of the safety of COCs
“have determined that for most healthy women, the health benefits [of COCs] clearly exceed the health
risks.” See id. at 36 n.157 (emphasis added) (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., STATEMENT:
CARCINOGENICITY OF COMBINED HORMONAL CONTRACEPTIVES AND COMBINED MENOPAUSAL
TREATMENT 1 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/ageing/cocs_hrt_
statement.pdf). Finally, the brief cites to a paper examining breast cancer risk in women with one of the
breast cancer genes, known as BRCA-1 or BRCA-2. See id. (citing Steven A. Narod et al., Oral
Contraceptives and the Risk of Breast Cancer in BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutation Carriers, 94 J. NAT’L
CANCER INST. 1773, 1773 (2002) (stating that for women with one of these genes or with a family
history of breast cancer, hormonal contraceptives may indeed be contraindicated)).
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carcinogens” published by the American Cancer Society. The brief fails
to disclose that this list, which also includes “alcoholic beverages,”
includes substances that are known to cause cancer under certain
circumstances.186 As the American Cancer Society emphasizes in a section
entitled “Some important points about the IARC and NTP lists here,” “[t]he
lists themselves say nothing about how likely it is that an agent will cause
cancer,” and the likelihood of an agent causing cancer may be based on the
amount and type of exposure.187 Indeed, the society states that “[e]ven if a
substance or exposure is known or suspected to cause cancer, this does not
necessarily mean that it can or should be avoided at all costs,” and refers
specifically to “estrogen,” a “known carcinogen that occurs naturally in the
body.”188
In fact, the best research shows that overall, the net effect of COC use
on cancer is “negligible.”189 COCs actually protect users against cancers of
the endometrium and ovary,190 and may also protect against colorectal and
uterine cancers.191 The opposition completely ignores the most recent
studies—large, prospective cohort trials in the United States and United
Kingdom—both of which found no association between current or former
use of combined oral contraceptives, and an increased risk of diagnosis of
breast cancer.192 As the authors of one of the newer studies noted, an older
study finding an association between the use of COCs and an increased
risk of breast cancer in young women was outdated.193 The old study had
pooled data from fifty-four epidemiologic studies conducted over the past
185

Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 36 (citing Known and
Probable Human Carcinogens, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses
/othercarcinogens/generalinformationaboutcarcinogens/known-and-probable-human-carcinogens (last
visited Feb. 13, 2015)).
186
Known and Probable Human Carcinogens, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer
/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/generalinformationaboutcarcinogens/known-and-probable-humancarcinogens (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
187
Id. (“As noted above, the type and extent of exposure to a substance may also play a role. You
should consider the actual amount of increased risk when deciding if you should limit or avoid an
exposure.”).
188
Id.
189
HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 63.
190
Id. at 62–63 (citing Ronald Burkman et al., Safety Concerns and Health Benefits Associated
with Oral Contraception, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S5, S8 (2004)).
191
Id. (citing Philip C. Hannaford et al., Mortality Among Contraceptive Pill Users: Cohort
Evidence from Royal College of General Practitioners’ Oral Contraception Study, 340 BRIT. MED. J.
c927, c927 (2010) (reporting that a recent study found that the risk of death for colorectal, uterine, and
ovarian cancer is lower among women who had used COCs than those who had never used COCs)).
192
Id. at 63 (citing Philip C. Hannaford et al., Cancer Risk Among Users of Oral Contraceptives:
Cohort Data from the Royal College of General Practitioners’ Oral Contraception Study, 335 BRIT.
MED. J. 651, 651 (2007); Polly A. Marchbanks et al., Oral Contraceptives and the Risk of Breast
Cancer, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2025, 2025 (2002)).
193
Id. (citing Ronald Burkman et al., Safety Concerns and Health Benefits Associated with Oral
Contraception, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S5 (2004)).
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twenty-five years, and new data was needed “now that larger numbers of
women who took oral contraceptives early in their reproductive years
are reaching the age at which the risk of breast cancer is highest.”194 In
response, scientists designed a population based case-control study, the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Women’s
Contraceptive and Reproductive
Experiences (Women’s CARE)
Study, to examine the use of oral contraceptives as a risk factor for
breast cancer in women who were thirty-five to sixty-four years old and
in subgroups of women defined according to race, age, presence or
absence of a family history of breast cancer, and other factors.195 The
study interviewed approximately 9,000 women, approximately half with
breast cancer and half without, who were interviewed as controls, and
determined their relative risks of breast cancer.196 The researchers found
that “[a]mong women from 35 to 64 years of age, current or former oral
contraceptive use was not associated with a significantly increased risk of
breast cancer.”197
Similarly, a study in the United Kingdom reported in the British
Medical Journal that included more than a million “woman years” of
observation accumulated over thirty-six years, found that oral
contraception was not associated with a significantly increased risk of any
cancer and that “the estimated overall absolute reduction in risk of any
cancer among ever users of combined oral contraceptives was 45 per
100,000 woman years . . . .”198
Depending on which dataset was examined, our analyses
suggest either a statistically significant 12% reduced risk
of any cancer (main dataset) or a more modest, nonsignificant, 3% reduction (general practitioner observation
dataset). In either case we found no evidence of a
substantial increased risk of cancer overall. A major
strength of the study was the ability to include more than a
million woman years of observation, accumulated over 36
years. Virtually all of the women in the study are now
post-menopausal, of an age when many cancers
become common.199
Finally, another three studies have found that COC use has neither a

194

Marchbanks et al., supra note 192, at 2025.
Id. at 2025–26.
196
Id. at 2025.
197
Id.
198
Hannaford et al., supra note 192, at 653–54.
199
Id. at 653.
195
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3. Impact on Cardiovascular Disease
The opponents’ claim that hormonal contraceptives increase the risks
of cardiovascular disease, i.e., myocardial infarction (heart attack) and
stroke, is false as applied to most women.201 Although the use of COCs is
generally associated with an increased risk of cardiovascular disease
because it can increase the risk of developing a clot that can cause a heart
attack or a stroke, there is no increased risk of stroke in nonsmoking
women under age thirty-five, who use COCs with less than fifty mcg
estrogen.202 Similarly, women who do not smoke, are not diabetic, and
have normal blood pressure levels have no increased risk of myocardial
infarction.203 Finally, the evidence shows that women are at the biggest risk
of forming a clot that could cause a heart attack or stroke when they are
pregnant.204 Therefore, any contraceptive that prevents pregnancy
ultimately decreases the risk of forming a clot.205
C. Contraceptives Improve the Health of Children By Allowing Women to
Increase the Space Between Births.
There is confusion in both the IOM Report and in the opposition
Amicus Brief and article between the impact of the intentionality of
pregnancy on maternal and child health with the impact of birth spacing on
birth outcomes. I will assume for the sake of argument that neither the
IOM Report nor the opponents of contraception intended to confuse the
two. It may be that confusion on the issue is more useful to the opponents
than it is to the IOM Report, but either way, I aim to end the confusion
here. In this Article, I separate these two factors that potentially impact
maternal and child health and discuss what the most recent data shows and
does not show about each.
As the IOM Report found, increasing the space between births206—
200

HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 63 (citing Hannaford et al., supra note 192; M. Vessey, et
al., Factors Affecting Mortality in a Large Cohort Study with Special Reference to Oral Contraceptive
Use, 82 CONTRACEPTION 221 (2010); P.A. Wingo et al., Oral Contraceptives and the Risk of Death
from Breast Cancer, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 793 (2007)).
201
Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 35.
202
Id.
203
HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 63.
204
Id.
205
See id. (discussing how women are at the highest risk of forming a blood clot that could cause
a heart attack or stroke when they are pregnant).
206
This should not be confused with the evidence concerning the impact on the health of children
born of “unintended” pregnancies. Opponents of contraception have tried to undermine the very strong
evidence that longer pregnancy intervals improve birth outcomes by confusing it with the evidence
concerning the impact on the health of children born of “unintended” pregnancies. Brief of Amicus
Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 36. The benefits of reducing unintended
pregnancies—which I discuss infra at Part IV.D—are significant but differ from the benefits of
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which contraception allows—reduces adverse pregnancy outcomes, like
preterm births, prematurity, and low-birth weight.207 One critic of
contraceptive use disputes this finding but reveals that her main concern is
not the health of children who are born, but rather a normative concern that
the procreative potential of intercourse is being impeded. She writes,
“children’s health is not boosted by their being prevented from coming into
being.”208 Actually, the research establishes that children are healthier
when there is more space between pregnancies. This same anticontraception advocate disputes this fact,,arguing that the papers relied on
by the IOM Report “claim only to show an ‘associat[ion],’ not causation,
between shorter pregnancy intervals and low birth weight.”209 This is not
only incorrect because one of the papers specifically finds causation,210 but
it is also based on a fundamental and quite shocking misunderstanding of
the purposes and benefits of quantitative statistical analysis.211
The purpose of statistical analysis is to determine whether certain
studied factors are “associated” with certain outcomes and, if so, how
strong the associations are. To determine the strength of the associations,
study authors attempt to control for other potential causes, which constitute
potential confounding factors. The more confounding factors are
eliminated as potential causes of a given outcome, the likelier it is that the
studied factor is the cause. As a basic quantitative research text notes, “a
well-designed quantitative study will allow us not just to look at what
happens, but to provide an explanation of why it happens as well. The key
lies in your research design and what variables you collect.”212
The studies relied on by the IOM Report recommending increased
access to contraceptives show “associations” of varying strengths that are
carefully explained.213 Based on the strength of these associations, and by
increasing pregnancy intervals.
207
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39870,
39872 (July 2, 2013).
208
Alvaré, supra note 1, at 392.
209
Alvaré, supra note 1, at 393.
210
B.P. Zhu, Effect of Interpregnancy Interval on Birth Outcomes: Findings from Three Recent
US Studies, 89 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS S25, S31 (2005).
211
I note that while the Amicus Brief’s critique of the IOM Report supporting increased access to
contraceptives uses these general criticisms of social science methods to attack studies that undermine
their point of view, the Brief relies on other studies using these same criticized methods, when they find
data that they believe supports their point of view. E.g., supra Part IV.B.2. While there is a deep and
extensive literature about debates concerning the use of statistical analyses in social science, the
opponents’ willingness to rely on the same methods they criticize undermines any presumption that
they are engaging seriously with these critiques of social science and further undermines the claim that
contraception harms women.
212
As Introduction to Quantitative Research explains, the idea that “[w]e can never explain things
by using quantitative research,” is one of the “common misconceptions” concerning quantitative
research. DANIEL MUIJS, DOING QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IN EDUCATION WITH SPSS 9 (2d ed. 2011).
213
E.g., Agustin Conde-Agudelo et al., Birth Spacing and Risk of Adverse Perinatal Outcomes, A
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controlling for other possible confounding factors, study authors are able to
make causal inferences about the hypotheses studied or to provide an
assessment of the likelihood of causation based on the strength of the
associations. As a major text in the field states:
Avoiding causal language when causality is the real subject
of investigation either renders the research irrelevant or
permits it to remain undisciplined by the rules of scientific
inference. Our uncertainty about causal inferences will never
be eliminated. But this uncertainty should not suggest that we
avoid attempts at causal inference. Rather we should draw
causal inferences where they seem appropriate but also
provide the reader with the best and most honest estimate of
the uncertainty of that inference.214
Turning back to the scientific literature relied upon by the IOM Report
concerning the relationship between birth outcomes and longer intervals
between pregnancies, one of the three papers cited reports that “there is a
causal relationship between interpregnancy interval and adverse birth
outcomes,” and “[t]he optimal interpregnancy interval for preventing
adverse birth outcomes appeared to be approximately 18–23 months,
departing from which the risk for adverse birth outcomes increased,
although the increase was not appreciable unless the interpregnancy
interval was shorter than 6 months or longer than 5 years.”215 That paper
reported on three studies that were “conducted in various populations,
using different study designs, stratified by, and controlling for various
maternal reproductive risk factors [that] addressed a number of
methodological limitations regarding previously published studies.”216
The second and third papers did not claim causation, but did report a
“significant association” and an “independent association” respectively
between pregnancy intervals and an increased risk of adverse pregnancy
outcomes.217 The second paper is a systematic review published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association using three different metaMeta Analysis, 295 JAMA 1809, 1809–23 (2006); Elena Fuentes-Afflick & Nancy A. Hessol,
Interpregnancy Interval and the Risk of Premature Infants, 95 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 383, 383–
390 (2000); Zhu, supra note 210, at S25–S33.
214
GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH 76 (1994); see also RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS
184–85 (Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010) (discussing “causal-process observations”).
215
Zhu, supra note 210, at S31 (emphasis added).
216
Id. at S31.
217
See Conde-Agudelo et al., supra note 213, at 1821 (“birth to conception intervals shorter than
18 months and longer than 59 months are significantly associated with increased risk of several adverse
perinatal outcomes, such as preterm birth, LBW, and SGA.”); Fuentes-Afflick & Hessol, supra note
213, at 388 (“we found that interpregnancy intervals less than 18 months and more than 59 months
were independently associated with the risk of premature infants”).
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analytical techniques to pool data from numerous individual studies of the
relationship between pregnancy intervals and adverse perinatal
outcomes.218 That paper reports that birth to conception intervals shorter
than eighteen months and longer than fifty-nine months are “significantly
associated” with increased risk of several adverse perinatal outcomes, such
as preterm birth, low birth weight, and fetuses that are small for gestational
age.219 The study controlled for a number of potential confounding factors
that had been suggested such as socioeconomic status, unstable lifestyles,
failure to use health care services, or inadequate use of such services,
unplanned pregnancies, and other behavioral or psychological
determinants.220 However, the study reports that “the birth spacing effects
are not strongly attenuated when socioeconomic and maternal
characteristics are controlled for suggest[ing] that the effects are not
caused by these confounding factors,” which importantly include the
unplanned nature of the pregnancy.221
The third paper similarly found that “interpregnancy intervals were
independently associated with the risk of prematurity in [the] study.”222 It
also reported that two other factors were associated more strongly with the
risk of premature infants, namely previous premature or small for
gestational age infant and utilization of prenatal care, both of which were
consistent with previous studies.223 Thus, the paper identified
interpregnancy interval as a third strong indicator of adverse pregnancy
outcomes which, unlike previous indicators of adverse pregnancy
outcomes, is a potentially modifiable factor. As two papers reporting
strong associations and eliminating potential confounding factors, they,
like the first paper,224 provide strong evidence of a causal link. Because
interpregnancy intervals are a potentially modifiable risk factor for low
birth weight,225 recommendations that come from these studies support the
use of family planning to support optimal pregnancy spacing.226
D. Impact of Pregnancy Intention on Child and Maternal Health
The opponents argue that when studying the impact of pregnancy
intention on health, the failure to account for differing categories of
intention invalidates study findings as a whole.227 If a pregnancy is
218

Conde-Agudelo et al., supra note 213, at 1821.
Id.
220
Id. at 1809, 1821.
221
Id. at 1821.
222
Fuentes-Afflick & Hessol, supra note 213, at 388–89.
223
Id.
224
See Zhu, supra note 210.
225
Id.
226
Fuentes-Afflick & Hessol, supra note 213, at 389; Zhu, supra note 210, at S32.
227
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 22–23.
219
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“unintended,” this can mean either (1) that the woman wants to have a
child, or another child, in the future but not at the time she gets pregnant,
or (2) the woman has finished childbearing or does not ever intend to have
a child.228 As a 2008 literature review explained, most survey instruments
will refer to the first group as pregnancies that are “mistimed” or “wanted
later,” and the second group as pregnancies that are “not wanted at all.”229
Studies often consider these two categories together, underestimating the
true effect of pregnancies that are “not wanted at all,” and overestimating
the effect of a pregnancy that is “mistimed” or “wanted later.”230 While it
would be helpful if future studies separated outcomes based on these
different categories to assist public health officials in formulating strategies
to help those impacted most negatively by unintended pregnancy, it does
not undermine what we do know about unintended pregnancies as a
group.231 A recent survey of the literature concerning the impact of
intention on birth outcomes clarifies what current studies do and do not tell
us about this factor.232
In a literature review examining the evidence of the impact of intention
on child and parental health, the authors report that the field is incomplete.
On the one hand, the authors report a considerable number of studies (often
conducted in the United States), showing consistently disturbing results on
prenatal care, breastfeeding, child abuse, maternal health, and abortions.
These are outcomes that cannot be ignored and that are described in what
follows.233 On the other hand, the evidence of the impact of intention on
some child and parental health outcomes is “mixed and . . . limited by an
insufficient number of studies for some outcomes” and by some
measurement and analytical concerns.234 For example, for outcomes “such
as maternal risk behaviors, pregnancy outcomes, and curative care,
developed country studies failed to find a significant association with
pregnancy intention[, with] the paucity of studies . . . preclud[ing] an
overall assessment of such an impact.”235 The authors call for more studies
to address these concerns and to increase understanding of the impacts of

228
Jessica D. Gipson et al., The Effects of Unintended Pregnancy on Infant, Child, and Parental
Health: A Review of the Literature, 39 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 18, 19 (2008).
229
Id. at 19–20.
230
Id. at 19.
231
See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in
the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 91 (2006)
(“[C]lassifying all pregnancies ending in abortion as unintended should have minimal impact on our
calculated rates.”).
232
Gipson, supra note 228, at 18–19.
233
Id. at 29–30.
234
Id. at 29.
235
Id. at 30.
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236

1. Impact of Pregnancy Intention on Prenatal Care, Breastfeeding,
Child Abuse, and Maternal Health
The evidence concerning the impact of whether a pregnancy is
intended on prenatal care and breastfeeding behavior “is relatively
consistent, showing a negative effect of unintended pregnancy.”237 Studies
in developed countries “found more pronounced effects on the timing,
rather than the frequency, of antenatal care and found persistent negative
effects on the breastfeeding of children who resulted from unintended
pregnancies.”238 For example, “[n]early all United States and European
studies assessing the effect of pregnancy intention on breastfeeding have
concluded that children who are born from unintended pregnancies are less
likely to be breastfed or are more likely to be breastfed for a shorter
duration, compared with children whose birth was intended.”239 Even
within the same family, children born from unintended pregnancies “were
significantly less likely to be breastfed, after controlling for other
sociodemographic characteristics.”240
Moreover, studies from developed countries suggest a positive
association between unintended pregnancy and child abuse. In a
population-based study that analyzed data for 14,256 children from the
United Kingdom:
Children . . . who were registered with the child protection
agency by the age of six . . . were nearly three times more
likely than others to have resulted from a pregnancy that the
mother considered to be unintended . . . , after controlling for
birth weight, child health, developmental problems, and
reported positive attributes of the child.241
With regard to a link between unintended childbearing and maternal
health outcomes, studies have not shown any impact on maternal physical
health, but a number of studies from developed countries suggest a link
between unintended childbearing and a significantly increased risk of
maternal depression, anxiety, and a decline in psychological well-being or

236
See id. (discussing the need for future studies on the topic to try to pinpoint the causal
relationship between presence of intent in pregnancy and children’s health outcomes more accurately).
237
Id. at 30. On the other hand, “[n]o effects were found in the few studies assessing the
association between pregnancy intention and well-baby care, child immunization, or curative care in
the United States and Europe.” Id. at 25.
238
Id. at 30.
239
Id. at 24.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 27.
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psychosocial conditions. As one 1999 study of longitudinal data from
the National Survey of Families and Households found, “[a]fter controlling
for maternal characteristics, total number of children in the family, and
presence in the household of a child aged five to eighteen, mothers who
had experienced any unwanted births reported higher levels of depression
and lower levels of happiness.”243 This 1999 study also found that
“mothers who had experienced unwanted births were more likely to spank
or slap their children and to have spent less leisure time with them,
compared with other mothers.”244 While the studies showed that negative
outcomes were “significantly exacerbated by the mother’s mental health
status,” more research is needed to control for preexisting mental illness
and other markers of prior psychosocial well-being before firm
assessments can be made.245
As a result of these established negative outcomes, the study authors
conclude that
[t]he evidence of the impact of unintended pregnancy on
abortion-related morbidity and mortality points to the need
for primary and secondary prevention efforts. Primary
prevention, through the increased provision and use of
effective contraceptive methods, can reduce levels of
unintended pregnancy. In the event of an unintended
pregnancy, secondary prevention efforts can help to ensure
safe abortion and postabortion services to prevent ongoing
illness and death for the estimated 46 million women around
the world who have abortions each year.246
2. Impact of Pregnancy Intention on Abortion
One of the greatest benefits of contraception is that it reduces the
number of unintended pregnancies, thereby reducing the number of
abortions. In 2001, unintended pregnancies accounted for 49% of all
pregnancies, 3.1 million of a total of 6.4 million pregnancies, or 51
pregnancies per 1,000 women aged fifteen to forty-four in the United
States.247 Of these 3.1 million unintended pregnancies, 42%—or
approximately 20% of all pregnancies—ended in abortions.248 One could
reduce the proportion of pregnancies that are called “unintended” if that
242

Id. at 28.
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 28, 30.
246
Id. at 29–30.
247 Finer & Henshaw, supra note 231, at
90–92, 92 fig.1, 93, 93 tbl.1. In 2001, unintended
pregnancies accounted for 49% of all pregnancies, a rate virtually unchanged from 1994. Id. at 92.
248
Id.
243
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group were limited to those pregnancies that are “never wanted,” and
creating a third group of “mistimed/wanted later” pregnancies.
Presumably the proportion of pregnancies that are “never wanted” that then
result in abortion is going to be higher than the proportion of pregnancies
that are “mistimed,” or “wanted later.” The reclassification will not reduce
the overall proportion of pregnancies that result in abortions, though.
Contraception that reduces the incidence of pregnancies that are “never
wanted,” as well as those that are “mistimed” or “wanted later” will.249
Reduction of the incidence of abortions occurring in this fashion is a
good thing if you believe in reproductive rights and justice, because the
reduction of abortions is coming from reduction in the demand for
abortion, as opposed to coming from cutting off the supply of or restricting
the ability of women to access abortions.250 This should also be a good
thing if you are against abortion itself. If your opposition to abortion is,
however, in part based on the idea that the risk of pregnancy serves as a
check on, or punishment for, immoral sex—sex outside of marriage, or sex
between husband and wife undertaken for pleasure alone with as close to
zero risk of pregnancy as possible—then this is not necessarily so. Instead
of being viewed as a good that reduces the number of abortions,
contraceptives are seen as promoting immoral sex and allowing it to go
unpunished.251
V. CONTRACEPTIVES ARE NOT ABORTIFACIENTS
The opponents of contraception also follow in the footsteps of
Anthony Comstock by linking contraception to abortion.252 In the twentyfirst century, this linkage is attempted by arguing that some contraceptive
drugs and devices actually operate as abortifacients and end a
249 Finer & Henshaw, supra note 231, at
90–92; see also INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE
SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 32, at 105 (2011); John Bongaarts & Charles F.
Westoff, The Potential Role of Contraception in Reducing Abortion, 31 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 193, 200
(2000) (“The incidence of abortion can be reduced by raising contraceptive prevalence and
effectiveness.”); Jeffrey F. Peipert et al., Preventing Unintended Pregnancies by Providing No-Cost
Contraception, 120 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1291, 1291–93, 1295–96 (2012) discussing the
results of a study conducted on women at risk of unintended pregnancy that showed a decrease in
abortion rates with women enrolled in the Contraceptive CHOICE Project).
250
See Bongaarts & Westoff, supra note 249, at 200 (arguing that if contraceptives were more
accessible to women, the need for abortions due to unintended pregnancies would decrease).
251
See, e.g., Paul D. O’Callaghan, Pseudosex in Pseudotheology, 4 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 83, 83–
84, 86–87 (1998) (presenting the argument of John Beaumont that social acceptance of contraceptive
sex leads to further social acceptance of other forms of immoral sex, such as homosexual intercourse).
252
See Maryam T. Afif, Comment, Prescription Ethics: Can States Protect Pharmacists Who
Refuse to Dispense Contraceptive Prescriptions?, 26 PACE L. REV. 243, 244–46 (2005) (explaining the
history of Anthony Comstock’s crusade against immoral behavior and describing publications that
promoted the use of birth control and abortions, which led several states to criminalize the use of
contraceptives and abortions).
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“pregnancy.” The argument relies on two claims, both of which are
false.
First, the opponents argue that “pregnancy” occurs as soon as the egg
is fertilized by the sperm, prior to implantation of the fertilized egg into the
uterine lining. As shown below, this is contrary to the medical definition of
pregnancy, not to mention common sense given the significant number of
fertilized eggs that fail to implant on their own, exiting the body with no
fanfare, without the use of any contraceptive device. Second, the
opponents also argue that contraceptive devices have the power to prevent
implantation of a fertilized egg. They lodge this accusation against five
contraceptive methods in the Hobby Lobby litigation. As I discuss in detail
below, it has been established conclusively that four of the five
contraceptive methods cannot prevent implantation of a fertilized egg and
so cannot terminate a “pregnancy,” even defined in the way the opponents
define it. The fifth, the copper IUD, could prevent implantation, but only if
inserted after ovulation, i.e., after the egg has been released from the ovary
but before it has traveled out of the body. Notably, despite this proof that
these four contraceptives can never act to prevent implantation of the
fertilized egg and so do not “abort” a “pregnancy,” even under the
incorrect definition of that term used by the opposition, anti-contraception
advocates have not withdrawn their opposition to these four forms of
contraception.
A. Definition of Pregnancy
The opposition’s claim that an “abortion” can occur if a fertilized egg
is prevented from implanting into the uterine lining relies on the contention
that “pregnancy” begins when the ovum is fertilized by sperm—even
before the egg has implanted in the uterine lining. This is an argument
anti-abortion and anti-contraceptive advocates have used inconsistently in
the past.254
One problem with the opposition’s claim is that according to the
descriptions of pregnancy in obstetrical textbooks written by professional
organizations of obstetricians and gynecologists in the United States and
abroad, and by the United States Federal Government, “pregnancy” starts
253
“Other religious institutions opposed only to abortion were affected by the Mandate’s
inclusion of ECs and other contraceptives, which, according to the federal government and their
manufacturers, can act at some times as an abortifacient, i.e., to destroy a human embryo.” Alvaré,
supra note 1, at 384. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the claimants opposed coverage of four types of
contraceptives because they believed they were abortifacients. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
254
Joerg Dreweke, Contraception Is Not Abortion: The Strategic Campaign of Antiabortion
Groups to Persuade the Public Otherwise, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Fall 2014, at 14, 14 (noting
that anti-abortion groups have “selectively embraced the core ‘personhood’ argument—that U.S. policy
should in some circumstances recognize pregnancy as beginning at fertilization—as a way to
undermine access to birth control”).
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only after implantation of an already fertilized egg. For example, the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists notes that a
“pregnancy is considered to be established only after implantation is
complete,”255 a process that “can be completed as early as eight days or as
late as 18 days after fertilization, but [that] usually takes about 14 days.”256
Indeed, it is only after implantation that a pregnancy test will register as
positive because of the hormonal changes that occur after implantation.257
The National Institutes of Health take a similar position. Federal
regulations governing human subjects research define pregnancy as
“encompass[ing] the period of time from implantation until delivery.”258
Part of the reason for this definition is the high number of fertilized eggs
that fail to implant even without the use of any contraceptives.259
According to the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
“between one-third and one-half of all fertilized eggs never fully
implant.”260
Opponents dismiss these definitions of pregnancy, attributing the
definitions to the supposed pro-choice leanings of both the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the federal government.261
But this ignores that even the Bush Administration, self-defined as
promoting a “culture of life,”262 adopted rules to implement the Hyde
Amendment—the federal statute banning federal funding for abortions in
the Medicaid program263—that defined pregnancy in accordance with the
medical consensus represented by the American College of Obstetricians
255
Rachel Benson Gold, supra note 15, at 7, 8 (quoting the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists’ position).
256
Id.
257
It takes two weeks for a urine pregnancy test to become positive. See Allen J. Wilcox, Donna
Day Baird, & Clarice R. Weinberg, Time of Implantation of the Conceptus and Loss of Pregnancy, 340
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1796, 1797 (1999) (noting that it normally takes eight, nine, or ten days for
implantation to occur after ovulation).
258
45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (2013).
259
Gold, supra note 15, at 8 (citing ACOG).
260
Id.
261
See CATHY CLEAVER RUSE & ROB SCHWARZWALDER, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
BEST PRO-LIFE ARGUMENTS FOR SECULAR AUDIENCES 2 (2011), available at
http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF11J30.pdf (citing ROBERT G. MARSHALL & CHARLES A. DONOVAN,
BLESSED ARE THE BARREN: THE SOCIAL POLICY OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD 293 (1991) (reporting that
in 1965, “ACOG stated in its first Terminology Bulletin that ‘Conception is the implantation of a
fertilized ovum’”)); see also MARSHALL & DONOVAN, BLESSED ARE THE BARREN: THE SOCIAL
POLICY OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD at 293 (1991) (“[G]iven the political leaning of governmental
agencies, academic institutions, and the scientific publishing industry it would not be surprising if it
were correct that ‘the medical community has long been clear: Pregnancy is established when a
fertilized egg has been implanted in the wall of a woman’s uterus.’” (quoting Gold, supra note 15, at
7)).
262
Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Hails Progress Toward ‘Culture of Life’; Limits on Abortion, Stem
Cell Use Cited, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
263
Gold, supra note 15, at 7.

2015]

CONTRACEPTIVE COMSTOCKERY

1015

264

and Gynecologists. Those rules block the use of public funds to pay for
abortion services for low-income women but make clear that funding is
available for “drugs or devices to prevent implantation of the fertilized
ovum,” thus excluding these drugs and devices from the definition of
abortion.265 These rules, which remain in effect today, say that pregnancy
“encompasses the period of time from implantation until delivery.”266
Thus, even if the contraceptives could prevent a fertilized egg from
implanting, they would not be terminating a “pregnancy”; they would be
preventing one.267 Opposition to any drug or device that prevents a
fertilized egg from implanting in a woman’s uterine lining, opposition
stemming from their belief that a fertilized egg is a “human life” deserving
of protection, is therefore not opposition to “abortion,” it is by definition
opposition to a form of contraception.268
B. Mechanisms of Action of Emergency Contraception and IUDs
In response to this claim, one could argue that the important point is
not whether prevention of implantation by a fertilized egg is termination of
a “pregnancy,” and thus is considered an “abortion.” Instead, one could
argue that one is opposed to medicines or devices that prevent a fertilized
egg from implanting because one believes that the fertilized egg is a
“human life,” and preventing implantation is immoral in its own right,
even if one were to call it contraception or prevention of implantation by a
fertilized egg. Indeed, one could simply argue that one is opposed to
certain forms of contraception that had this effect. This is a perfectly valid
moral position for someone to hold and has the benefit of honesty, of not
trying to muddy the waters by playing fast and loose with medical
terminology.
The problem with this second argument is that once again the science
does not support the opposition. The question is whether Emergency
Contraception and IUDs, which were singled out for attack in the Hobby
Lobby litigation,269 are effective only because they prevent fertilization in
264
See id. (noting that the same federal regulations meant to effect the Hyde Amendment
eventually aligned with the medical community’s consensus that pregnancy begins once implantation
has commenced).
265
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
266
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
267
See 45 C.F.R § 46.202(f) (2013) (providing the legal definition of pregnancy as beginning at
implantation); infra note 269 (explaining that contraceptives cannot act after the embryo is implanted).
268
Id.
269
It is undisputed that none of the products clinicians and scientists call contraceptives can act
after the embryo is implanted in the uterine lining, which is when a pregnancy begins. See Gillian Dean
& Eleanor Bimla Schwarz, Intrauterine Contraceptives (IUCs), in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 147,
150 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011) (discussing mechanism of action); see also
Deborah Bartz & Alisa B. Goldberg, Injectable Contraceptives in Contraceptive Technology, in
CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 209, 210 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011) (discussing
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the first instance or whether they sometimes are also effective in
preventing implantation of a fertilized egg. Although the evidence was not
always clear, as discussed in what follows, the medical evidence has now
conclusively established that four of the five contraceptives never act to
prevent implantation and so never act as abortifacients, even under the
opponents’ expanded definition of pregnancy and abortion; only one, the
copper IUD, could sometimes prevent implantation of a fertilized egg if
inserted after ovulation.270
The opponents of contraception ignore research finalized in the last
fifteen years concerning the mechanism of action of EC pills and IUDs.271
There are two types of dedicated emergency contraceptive pills272 that are
available for use in the United States: “Plan B One-Step”273 (and its generic
alternative, Next Choice)274 and “ella.”275 Copper-releasing IUDs can also
be used as an emergency contraceptive device, though they are primarily
used as a regular form of birth control.276 A document written in 2006 and
made public by the Federal Drug Administration stated that Plan B “may
prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to the womb (implantation).”277
mechanism of action); Kavita Nanda, Contraceptive Patch and Vaginal Contraceptive Ring, in
CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 343, 344, 355–56 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011)
(discussing mechanism of action); Anita L. Nelson & Carrie Cwiak, Combined Oral Contraceptives
(COCs), in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 249, 257–58 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed.
2011) (discussing mechanism of action); Elizabeth G. Raymond, Contraceptive Implants in
Contraceptive Technology, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 193, 194–95 (Robert A. Hatcher et al.
eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011) (discussing mechanism of action); Elizabeth G. Raymond, Progestin-Only
Pills, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 237, 237–38 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed.
2011) (discussing mechanism of action).
270
This arguably should have an impact on the position of Hobby Lobby Stores and other
claimants opposing coverage of contraceptives on the basis that they prevent implantation of a
fertilized egg. If that was truly the basis—and not an objection to all contraceptives or to hormonal
contraceptives based on the use of a hormone, now that the Emergency Contraceptives Plan B, Ella,
and the hormonal IUD have been shown to act only by preventing ovulation and not by impacting
fertilization—then these claimants should agree to cover them.
271
First, it bears emphasis that none of the various Emergency Contraception options, nor any
other form of contraception, acts to terminate a pregnancy when pregnancy is defined—as ACOG and
all other major ob/gyn organizations define it—as occurring after the process of implantation is
complete. In other words, they cannot abort a pregnancy so defined and, as such, are completely
different medically from “medical abortion” or “the abortion pill.” See CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 151 (describing mechanisms of action of all contraceptive medications and devices).
272
James Trussell & Eleanor Bimla Schwarz, Emergency Contraception, in CONTRACEPTIVE
TECHNOLOGY 113–45 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011).
273
Plan B One-Step (a single 1,500 mcg levonorgestrel pill) replaced the previously available
Plan B (two 750 mcg tablets of levonorgestrel) in 2009. Id. at 113.
274
A generic version of Plan B was approved in 2009. Id.
275
A single 30 mg ulipristal pill was approved in 2010 by the Federal Drug Administration. Id.
276
Id. at 121.
277
FDA’s
Decision
Regarding
Plan
B:
Questions
and
Answers,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm109
795.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2009) (emphasis added). The entire statement in response to the question
“How does Plan B work?” reads: “Plan B works like other birth control pills to prevent pregnancy. Plan
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This document, originally made available during the Bush Administration,
refers to Plan B as a contraceptive that “prevent[s] pregnancy,” “acts
primarily by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary (ovulation),”
and “may prevent the union of sperm and egg (fertilization).”278
However, the results of a 2012 study of the mechanisms of action of
the three forms of emergency contraception—Plan B (using the hormone
levonorgestrel (LNG)), ella (using the hormonal Ulipristal acetate (UPA)),
and the copper intrauterine device (CU-IUD)—confirm that: (1) Plan B
and ella both work by delaying or inhibiting ovulation and not by
inhibiting implantation of a fertilized egg;279 (2) ella’s increased
effectiveness results from its additional direct inhibitory effect on follicular
rupture, which allows it to be effective even when administered shortly
before ovulation,280 a time period when use of Plan B is no longer
effective; and (3) any effect of ella on the endometrium, the uterine lining,
was dose dependent. The effect of the proper dose of ella used for
Emergency Contraceptive purposes was “similar to that of placebo.”281 The
study did find that the additional increased effectiveness of the copper IUD
stems from the additional effect it has on the endometrium.282 Thus, the
only one of these emergency contraceptive devices that could potentially
prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg is a copper IUD.
Because opponents of contraceptives continue to oppose their use even
when it is clear that they work by preventing conception, rather than by
preventing a fertilized egg from implanting, the campaign against
contraceptives is revealed to reflect conflicts reaching far beyond the
“abortion question,” and the ethics of protection of “human life.” Rather,
the campaign reflects conflicts concerning the propriety of non-procreative
sex and particularly the ability of women to express their sexual desire
without consequences, without fear of pregnancy.283

B acts primarily by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary (ovulation). It may prevent the union
of sperm and egg (fertilization). If fertilization does occur, Plan B may prevent a fertilized egg from
attaching to the womb (implantation). If a fertilized egg is implanted prior to taking Plan B, Plan B will
not work.” Id.
278
Id. (emphasis added).
279
Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson et al., Emergency Contraception—Mechanisms of Action, 87
CONTRACEPTION 300, 305 (2013).
280
Id.
281
Id. at 304.
282
Id.
283
Cf. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 301–02 (noting that a similar conflict
concerning gender roles, motherhood, and women’s sexuality lurks behind opposition to abortion based
on a claimed desire to protect potential life).
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VI. INCREASED ACCESS TO THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRACEPTIVES
LOWERS THE RATE OF TEEN PREGNANCY,
UNINTENDED PREGNANCIES, AND ABORTIONS
Finally, I close with a report from the field, which provides the good
news that removing financial barriers and providing full-options
counseling about all forms of contraception to a group of sexually active
women who sought to avoid pregnancy for at least twelve months works to
reduce the numbers of abortions, teen pregnancy rates, and high risk
births.284 Public health practitioners report285 that the increasing acceptance
of IUDs and contraceptive implants, also known as “long acting reversible
contraceptives,” or “LARCs,” is “fundamentally changing the landscape of
reproductive health.”286 LARC use is endorsed by the premier
organizations in the medical field, such as the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Academy of Pediatrics, as
well as government and international agencies like the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization, because of
their safety records and extremely low failure rates.287 LARC use is
considered appropriate both for young women and teenagers who have not
yet given birth and for older women who have already had children.288
284
Gina M. Secura et al., Provision of No-Cost, Long-Acting Contraception and Teenage
Pregnancy, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1316, 1320 (2014). Contraceptive opponents make another claim
that increasing access to the most effective forms of contraception leads to an increase in unintended
pregnancy, rather than a decrease, on a population basis because it will increase rates of sexual activity.
See, e.g., Keith Riler, Editorial, Studies: Birth Control, Contraception Don’t Cut Abortions, LIFENEWS
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.lifenews.com/2012/02/17/studies-birth-control-contraception-dont-cutabortions/ (“Studies have shown that contraception increases sexual activity . . . . [a]nd more sex means
more pregnancies.”). A full response to this claim is outside the scope of this Article. Here, I simply
point out that the opponents have no evidence to support their claims. Indeed, all the evidence is to the
contrary; increased access to the most effective contraceptives is having the opposite effect with no
evidence of a change in the rates of sexual activity. Secura et al., supra, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. at
1320.
285
The opposition criticizes case studies establishing the success of programs offering the most
effective contraceptives at no cost. The opposition repeatedly discounts case studies because they study
only one population in one geographic area, and are not generalizable. Here, the opposition is
demonstrating one of the “five misunderstandings about case-study research.” See Bent Flyvbjerg, Five
Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research, 12 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 219, 221, 224–25 (2006)
(refuting the claim that “[o]ne cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case
study cannot contribute to scientific development”). As Flyvbjerg explains, “it is incorrect to conclude
that one cannot generalize from a single case. It depends on the case one is speaking of and how it is
chosen.” Id. at 225. “This applies to the natural sciences as well as to the study of human affairs.” Id.
Indeed, “[o]ne can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to
scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods.” Id. at 228
(emphasis added).
286
Sue Ricketts et al., Game Change in Colorado: Widespread Use of Long-Acting Reversible
Contraceptives and Rapid Decline in Births Among Young, Low-Income Women, 46 PERSP. ON SEXUAL
& REPROD. HEALTH 125, 125 (2014).
287
Id.
288
Id.
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LARCs have lower failure rates than condoms, diaphragms, and other
hormonal contraceptives like the pill, patch, and ring.289 Their low failure
rates are influenced by the reduced likelihood, as compared with the pill
and condoms, that users will use them incorrectly or fail to use them.290
Despite these advantages, there are substantial barriers to LARC use,
such as a lack of awareness among consumers and providers about the
availability, safety, and appropriateness of LARC methods, the time
required for counseling, and the high initial costs associated with their
implantation.291 Even Title X clinics—which receive funding to provide a
broad range of contraceptives to low-income patients, including LARC
methods, the pill, the patch, and barrier methods such as the diaphragm and
condoms292—have “historically struggled to meet the demand” for IUDs
and implants due to “their limited budgets and sliding-fee requirements,”
and the high upfront costs associated with the implantation of these
methods.293 Because of their advantages and the need to reduce these
recognized barriers, a number of pilot projects have been initiated across
the country to provide increased funding for and education about
LARCs.294 Studies of these projects show that when women receive
appropriate counseling regarding both the risks and benefits of
contraceptives and the appropriateness of different methods of
contraceptives to each individual, the rates of teenage births, unintended
pregnancies, and abortions drop dramatically.295
289

Id.
Id.
291
See id. (citing Stephanie B. Teal & S. Elizabeth Romer, Awareness of Long-Acting Reversible
Contraception Among Teens and Young Adults, 52 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S35, S36–S37 (2013)
(describing the lack of awareness among teens and young adults of the benefits and safety of longacting reversible contraception)); see also Nancy A. Dodson et al., Teen Pregnancy Prevention on a
LARC: An Update on Long-Acting Reversible Contraception for the Primary Care Provider, 24
CURRENT OPINION IN PEDIATRICS, 439, 442 (2012) (“A study involving telephone surveys and focus
groups of women aged 18–30 years found low levels of awareness of LARC methods.”); M.L.
Kavanaugh et al., Long-Acting Reversible Contraception for Adolescents and Young Adults: Patient
and Provider Perspectives, 26 J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 86, 91–92 (2013)
(describing cost barriers to initial implantation of LARCs); Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1316, 1317
(2014) (“Lack of information about effective contraception, limited access, and cost remain barriers to
use of LARC methods by teens.”).
292
Ricketts et al., supra note 286, at 126.
293
Id.
294
Id.; see Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1317–18 (describing the Contraceptive CHOICE
Project’s program whereby it provided LARCs to adolescents).
295
E.g., Ricketts et al., supra note 286, at 129 (“The two-year decline in the proportion of births
that were high-risk was 24% (a statistically significant decease), and the decline in the number of such
births was 27%.”); Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1320 (“We found that pregnancy, birth, and
abortion rates were low among teenage girls and women enrolled in a project that removed financial
and access barriers to contraception and informed them about the particular efficacy of LARC methods.
The observed rates of pregnancy, birth, and abortion were substantially lower than national rates among
all U.S. teens, particularly when compared with sexually experienced U.S. teens.”).
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For example, the Contraceptive CHOICE Project, a prospective cohort
study focused on 9,256 girls and women who ranged from fourteen to
forty-five years old and who lived in the Saint Louis area concluded that
the rates of pregnancy, birth, and abortion were “substantially lower than
the national rates” among all U.S. teens, “particularly when compared with
sexually experienced U.S. teens.”296 Abortion rates from the CHOICE
cohort were less than half the regional and national rates; the rate of
teenage birth within the CHOICE cohort was 6.3 per 1,000,297 compared to
the U.S. rate of 34.4 per 1,000.298 The rates were lower than the national
rates among different age groups and among both white and black teens.299
Women and adolescents were eligible for enrollment in the study if they
had no desire to become pregnant for at least twelve months, were sexually
active or planning to be sexually active with a male partner, and were
either not using a contraceptive method or were willing to switch to a new,
reversible method.300 All women provided written informed consent.301
Enrollees received standardized counseling regarding commonly used
reversible methods, which were presented “in order from most to least
effective, and the potential side effects, risks, and benefits of each method
were reviewed.”302
A similar program in Colorado, the Colorado Family Planning
Initiative, was so successful that it has been described as “gamechang[ing].”303 In 2009, the Initiative received private funding to initiate a
program at twenty-eight family planning clinics in counties that contained
95% of the state’s total population.304 The Initiative was designed to
address barriers to LARC use by training providers and providing funding
for LARC methods.305 Although all clients at or below 100% of the federal
poverty level paid nothing306 regardless of their chosen method, the LARC
methods and the contraceptive ring were offered to all clients at no cost,
while all other methods were offered on a sliding-fee scale.307 The study
reported that between 2009 and 2011, LARC method use among women
between fifteen and twenty-four years old had grown from below 5% to
296
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298
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299
Id. at 1320.
300
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301
Id.
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importance to insure that no women are pressured into using contraception or a specific method of
contraception.
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Id.
306
Id.
307
Id.
297

2015]

CONTRACEPTIVE COMSTOCKERY

1021

308

19%.
The study showed a significant positive impact on birth rates, abortion
rates, and high-risk births among teens and young women in the Initiative
counties as compared to women in the same age cohorts in the nonInitiative counties.309 First, the birth rate among all fifteen to nineteen-yearolds in Colorado declined 26% in just two years, between 2009 and 2011
(from thirty-seven to twenty-eight births per one thousand).310 During the
same period, the birth rate declined 12% among Colorado women aged
twenty to twenty-four (from eighty-nine to seventy-eight per one
thousand).311 Though not all of this decrease was due to LARC use, study
authors estimated that approximately 75% of the decline of the birth rates
among these age groups could be attributed to the decline in births among
low-income women in the CFPI counties.312 Study authors were also able
to rule out alternative explanations for the drop in fertility rates, such as the
potential that the rate of sexual activity decreased.313 The Colorado Youth
Risk Behavior Survey and the state Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System data showed “no significant change . . . in sexual activity among
high school students,” or among women aged eighteen to twenty-four
during the study time period.314
While the rate of abortions for twenty to twenty-four-year-old women
in the non-CFPI counties remained “essentially stable,”315 with a slight
increase between 2008 and 2011 (from twenty-six to twenty-eight per one
thousand),316 the decline in the rate of abortions for twenty to twenty-fouryear-olds in the CFPI group was a stunning 18%.317 There was also an
extraordinary decline in the rate of abortions for fifteen to nineteen-yearolds, which occurred both amongst those in the CFPI group and amongst
those in the non-CFPI group.318 The success of the family planning
initiative in this instance is reflected in the higher rate of decline for those
in the CFPI group (34%) than for those in the non-CFPI group (still a
308

Id. at 128.
See id. at 128–29 (discussing the statistically significant changes which occurred in birth rates,
high-risk birth rates, and abortion rates).
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See id. (“An estimated 77% and 74% of the decline among these age-groups, respectively, can
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313
Id. at 131.
314
Id.; see id. at 130 (“Nationally, widespread use of the pill and other hormonal methods has
contributed to steady declines in fertility rates among young women in recent decades, but our
finding of a rapid increase in LARC use—followed by a marked drop in fertility that was
especially large among teenagers—constitutes a new phenomenon.” (footnote omitted)).
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317
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significant 29%).
Finally, the number of high-risk births in CFPI
counties decreased in two years from a total of 4,052 in 2009 to 2,940 in
2011, representing a drop of 27%.320 In the non-CFPI counties, the number
of high-risk births declined from 272 to 233 between 2009 and 2011, a
decrease of only 14.3%.321
Another study evaluated the impact of California’s Family Planning,
Access, Care and Treatment (Family PACT) Program.322 Family PACT
was initially implemented by the California Legislature in 1997 and
“received federal financial participation through a Medicaid Family
Planning expansion waiver program in 2000.”323 “In March 2011,
California received approval from the Federal Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Service to make Family PACT a State Plan” as allowed by the
Affordable Care Act, enacted in March 2010.324
Family PACT, the nation’s largest Medicaid family planning
expansion program, served more than 1.7 million clients in fiscal year
2008–09, and reached more women and men than all the other Medicaid
“waiver programs” combined.325 “Family PACT provides reproductive
health and family planning services, including all U.S. Food and Drug
Administration-approved contraceptive methods, to eligible uninsured
clients who are at or below 200% of the federal poverty level.”326 Study
authors estimated that 286,700 unintended pregnancies were averted by
Family PACT services; 207,500 were avoided by adults (aged twenty to
forty-four years old) and almost 79,200 were avoided by adolescents (aged
fifteen to nineteen years old).327 “[T]he unintended pregnancies that were
prevented would have resulted in almost 120,000 abortions.”328 These
estimates were arrived at by adopting “conservative assumptions about
contraceptive use within the program and failure rates to avoid
overestimating the fertility effect of the program.”329
Finally, a recent related study found declines in abortion following

319

Id.
Id.
321
Id.
322
See generally Diana G. Foster et al., Estimating the Fertility Effect of Expansions of Publicly
Funded Family Planning Services in California, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 418, 418–24 (2011)
(reporting the methodology and results of a study that observed the number of prevented unintended
pregnancies accomplished by California’s Family PACT program and, therefore, the program’s
impact).
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increases in LARC use in Iowa. By assessing changes in LARC use and
subsequent abortion while controlling for initial LARC use, the study was
“able to remove region-level confounding, isolate the effect of LARC use
on abortion and establish a clear temporal relationship between LARC and
abortion.”331 Despite an increase in access to abortions in Iowa, the number
of resident abortions decreased from 5,198 to 3,887 (8.7 per 1000 women
aged 15 to 44 years old to 6.7 per 1,000 women in the same age group).332
Controlling for percentages of women living below the poverty line,
population density, and the increased availability of abortions, the authors
found a “significant longitudinal association between increases in LARC
use and the subsequent declines in abortion across Iowa regions.”333 The
study’s authors state that their estimates suggest that a small increase of “1
LARC user per 100 women in a given region was associated with a 4%
reduction in the odds of abortion for women living in that region.”334
VII. CONCLUSION
Underlying the opposition to contraception today, opposition framed in
woman-protective terms, lies an aversion to sex for pleasure, sex
undertaken for reasons other than procreation. This opposition to nonprocreative sex is remarkably regressive, extends to sex for pleasure within
marriage, and unites the opposition against reproductive rights and samesex marriage. To counteract the forces opposing broad contraceptive
access, we must examine the reasoning behind the opposition, look with
skepticism at reasons that appeal to science and abortion bias, and demand
that our decision-making bodies do the same.
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